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ABSTRACT 
The effect of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans was catastrophic and long- 
lasting. Katrina is the costliest, as well as one of the deadliest, natural disasters in the 
history of the United States. Eighty percent of New Orleans was flooded after the failure 
of levees bordering the 17th Street, London Avenue and Industrial canals. The United 
States Army Corps of Engineers (hurricane protection systems nationwide); Orleans 
Levee District (levee and floodwall maintenance); and Sewerage and Water Board of 
New Orleans (drainage 1899 to present) are key to the case study. This study traces the 
historical relationship between these governmental entities in connection with flood 
protection. The study began after the filing of massive class action litigation against the 
Corps of Engineers, Orleans Levee District and Sewerage and Water Board following 
Hurricane Katrina. The Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and 
Disaster Act of 1993 provided the boundaries for the study. A detailed analysis of the 
legislative history and legislative process added meaning and depth to the study.  A 
comprehensive review of jurisprudence interpreting the act, particularly § 735 is the 
heart of the study. The act provides for “immunity of personnel employed by the state, 
political subdivisions or agencies thereof…engaged in any homeland security and 
emergency preparedness activities…” The Orleans Levee District and Sewerage and 
Water Board of New Orleans’ assertion that the immunity provision of  § 735 applied to 
the discharge of their respective statutory responsibilities under state law in advance of, 
and following Katrina, is examined in context of the plaintiffs’ allegations for the levee 
and floodwall failures. The study concludes that § 735 is in dire need of overhaul given 
the judicial rulings rendered to date in the state and federal class court action litigation. 
 v
Additional research is needed on the federal, state and local level to develop legislation 
that will effectively and unquestionably render the state, political subdivisions or 
agencies thereof engaged in any homeland security and emergency preparedness 
activities immune from liability retroactively, now and in the future, in light of the recent 
narrow interpretation of the act by the courts.  
 vi
Chapter I 
                                                       Introduction 
Like most citizens of the Greater New Orleans area on Friday August 26, 2005 I was 
aware of a Tropical Storm somewhere off the coast of Florida but relatively unconcerned that it 
would have any impact on the City of New Orleans. On Saturday morning, August 27th, local 
television news personalities and weather reporters were alerting the public about the potential 
danger of Hurricane Katrina and the need to immediately make plans to evacuate. By early 
afternoon Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco proclaimed the “contraflow” 1 plan would be in 
effect at 4:00 PM.  Heeding the warnings by 8:00 PM we were on the road headed to Houston 
with thousands of other citizens fleeing the impending storm. By early Monday morning the 
worst of our fears rang true. The unimaginable sequence of events following the landfall of 
Hurricane Katrina on August 29th as a Category 4 hurricane,2 on the Saffir-Simpson scale, would 
change not only our personal lives but also my professional life as General Counsel for the 
Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans and lead me toward writing this dissertation 
narrowly defining the area of study.  
When leaving work on Friday evening I expected to return Monday morning to face the 
usual drone of lawyers advocating on behalf of clients seeking damages for the ever changing 
mix of slip and fall cases, contractor disputes, toxic tort and a few wrongful death cases.  Katrina 
changed that. I didn’t return to my desk until mid December 2005 having been detailed to live 
                                                     
1 Contraflow lane reversal is a program designed for quick emergency evacuation of an area. Incoming highway 
lanes to a city are changed to outbound lanes. This doubles the number of lanes available for outbound evacuation 
traffic. Crossover sections are used to move outgoing traffic to these lanes. All incoming traffic is blocked until the 
end of the program. 
2 The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a method developed in the early 1970s to measure storms based on wind 
speed, tidal surge and central pressure. The scale runs from Category 1 to Category 5, with Category 5 being the 
most destructive with winds greater than 155 mph and storm surge generally greater than 18 ft. above normal. Only 
three Category 5 hurricanes have made landfall in the United States since records began: The Labor Day Hurricane 
of 1935, Hurricane Camille (1969) and Hurricane Andrew in August 1992. 
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and work in Baton Rouge for over three and one half months. Upon my return the responsibility 
for representing the Sewerage and Water Board in numerous major class action lawsuits 
stemming from the failure of the levees and floodwalls of the 17th Street Canal, London Avenue 
Canal and Industrial Canal loomed larger than a behemoth. The litigation provides a challenging 
opportunity to in my continuing representation of the Sewerage and Water Board in what surely 
will be a landmark case. 
An intense investigation of the allegations lodged against the Sewerage and Water Board 
began with the task of drafting responsive pleadings to the growing number of lawsuits arriving 
daily. Comprehensive legal research for available defenses to the common claims led to the 
Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act. The act has a unique 
provision that was intended to serve as a valid legal defense and vehicle for summary dismissal 
from the litigation that was quickly becoming quite burdensome. That provision was § 735 
cloaked with the heading “immunity of personnel.” This is where this study begins.  
The stage is set in Chapter II “The Storm” with a chronology of Tropical Depression 
Twelve, later known as Hurricane Katrina, and the events leading up to the flooding of over 80% 
of the City of New Orleans on August 29th, 2005, hours after Hurricane Katrina made landfall.  
In Chapter III “The Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans; Orleans Levee District; 
and United Stares Army Corps of Engineers.” These entities are the principal, but not the only, 
governmental defendants in the litigation. I begin with an explanation of the respective roles that 
each defendant: Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans (drainage); Orleans Levee District 
(levee and floodwall maintenance); and United States Army Corps of Engineers (overall 
hurricane protection systems nationwide), individually and collectively play with flood control. 
The agencies working together at times, and sometimes independent of each other, have integral 
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roles in the overall network of facilities designed to prevent flooding from Lake Pontchartrain 
and vicinity in connection storm surges and hurricanes. Legislative reform of the Orleans Levee 
District after Hurricane Katrina will bring much needed and immediate changes to that manner in 
which that agency is operated.  
The relevant state statutes that are the foundation governing emergencies and disasters in 
the state provide the framework around which Chapter IV “The Louisiana State Statutes 
Governing Emergencies and Disasters,” is built. The origins of early emergency legislation 
directed to Civil Defense in 1950 predated the passing of the Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974. 
The enactment of the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, 
as amended, in and since 1993, lead to the status of the current law in effect. A detailed review of 
legislative history sheds light on the circumstances following Hurricane Andrew (1992) that was 
the impetus for the legislation proposed by Louisiana State Representative Huntington B. “Hunt” 
Downer. 
         Chapter V provides an in-depth evaluation and analysis of pending litigation in light of   
the § 735 immunity defense claimed by the Sewerage and Water Board and Orleans Levee 
District. Intrinsic in the analysis is a complete and up-to-date review of case law supporting  
recent rulings of the state and federal court. 
The findings as to whether § 735 of the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency 
Assistance and Disaster Act accomplished what the legislature intended is in Chapter VI. Lastly 
in Chapter VII the need for future research in suggested as a potential wide-ranging field will 
could lead those interested in this legal issue, or similar legal issues, with a plethora of ideas, 
references and directions.   
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Chapter II 
“We’re facing the storm most of us have feared!”  
On Tuesday, August 23, 2005, Tropical Depression Twelve formed over the southeastern 
Bahamas and was later upgraded to Tropical Storm Katrina. By 5:00 p.m. EDT, Thursday, 
August 25, 2005, Tropical Storm Katrina was upgraded to Hurricane Katrina, the fourth 
hurricane of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season.3  The hurricane made its first landfall as a 
Category 1 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale, near Hallandale Beach, Florida on 
the Miami-Dade/Broward county line. On Friday, August 26, 2005, the National Hurricane 
Center issued the following advisory: “…Katrina is forecast to become a Category 
3…major…hurricane today and on Saturday.”4 The possible track of the hurricane was shifted 
from the Florida Panhandle to the Mississippi/Louisiana coast.  
Following Hurricane Advisory No. 14, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco 
declared a state of emergency for the state.5 The declaration included activation of the state’s 
emergency response and recovery program under the command of the director of the state office 
of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness to supply emergency support services.  
On Saturday, August 27, 2005, as predicted, Hurricane Katrina reached Category 3 
intensity with winds between 111–130 mph. The National Hurricane Center posted a hurricane 
watch for southeast Louisiana, including the city of New Orleans.  A hurricane watch means 
hurricane conditions are possible in the specified area, usually within 36 hours. Messages from 
                                                     
3“Hurricane Katrina Advisory Archive,” NOAA National Hurricane Center, Tropical Storm Katrina Advisory 4. 
Aug. 24-30, 2005 <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/katrina.shtml>. 
4 Ibid. Number 14.  
5 State of Louisiana, Executive Department, Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005 (Aug. 26, 2005)  
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the National Hurricane Center highlighted the potential for Katrina to make a second landfall as 
a Category 4 or Category 5 storm. 6  
Governor Blanco requested President George W. Bush to declare a major disaster for the 
State of Louisiana, in order to release federal assistance. President Bush complied declaring a 
federal state of emergency in Louisiana7 under the authority of the Stafford Act. 8  
Later that afternoon, New Orleans Mayor, C. Ray Nagin, accompanied by Governor 
Blanco, announced a state of emergency and called for a voluntary evacuation of the city of New 
Orleans. Mayor Nagin stopped short of calling for a mandatory evacuation citing the need for his 
legal team to determine if he could order a mandatory evacuation without exposing the city to 
legal liability for closure of hotels and other businesses. Nagin strongly recommended all 
residents and visitors to voluntarily comply with the evacuation order particularly those living in 
lower areas.9 “We want you to take this a little more seriously and start moving – right now, as a 
matter of fact,” Nagin said during the joint press conference with Governor Blanco.10 A shelter 
of last resort was established at the Louisiana Superdome for anyone facing the inability to 
evacuate for whatever reasons. According to Louisiana National Guard Major General Bennett 
C. Landreneau “15,000-20,000 people had already taken refuge there” by Tuesday August 30, 
2005.11
        The National Hurricane Center is a part of the National Weather Service of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the United States Department of 
Commerce. Max Mayfield director of the Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center 
                                                     
6 NOAA National Hurricane Center, 18, 18A, 19, 20 & 21. 
7 President, Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Louisiana (August 27, 2005). 
8 Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Public Law 100-707, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5121-5206 (1988).   
9 Staff Writers, Times-Picayune [New Orleans, LA], August 27, 2005. 
10 Ibid. “Mayor Urges Storm Preparations.” 
11 Staff Writer, “Governor: Evac Superdome, Rescue Centers.”  Fox News/Associated Press. Aug. 30, 2005. 
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briefed Governor Blanco, Mayor Nagin and Mississippi Governor Barbour on Katrina’s status at 
8:00 p.m. EDT. Following Mayfield’s telephone conference the center issued Hurricane Katrina 
Advisory No. 19 at 10:00 p.m. CDT stating: “…dangerous Hurricane Katrina threatens the North 
Central Gulf Coast…a hurricane warning has been issued for the North Central Gulf Coast from 
Morgan City, Louisiana, Eastward to the Alabama/Florida Border…including the City of New 
Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain…coastal storm surge flooding of 15 to 20 feet above normal tide 
levels…locally as high as 25 feet along with large and dangerous battering waves…can be 
expected near and to the East of where the center makes landfall…heavy rains from Katrina 
should begin to affect the Central Gulf Coast Sunday evening. Rainfall totals of 5 to 10 
inches…with isolated maximum amounts of 15 inches…are possible along the path of 
Katrina.”12  
        It was reported that the National Hurricane Center Director had to call Nagin at home 
Saturday night and pleaded in no uncertain terms: “This is the Big One. In my thirty-three-year 
history at the Hurricane Center, I’ve never seen a storm this powerful, nor with the conditions 
like this that will allow it to become stronger, I would do whatever it took (sic) to get people out 
of there.”13 Mayfield is also reported to have said: “I want to be able to walk out of the 
Hurricane Center tonight and go to sleep knowing I’ve done everything I can to make sure 
everybody knows the threat of Hurricane Katrina…New Orleans is never going to be the 
same.”14  
On Sunday August 28 2005 at 12:40 a.m. CDT Hurricane Katrina reached Category 4 
level with 145 mph winds. By 6:15 a.m. CDT Katrina was a Category 5 storm, the highest 
                                                     
12 Ibid., NOAA National Hurricane Center, 19. 
13  John McQuaid and Mark Schleifstein, Path of Destruction: The Devastation of New Orleans and The Coming 
Age of Superstorms (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2006) 175 
14 Ibid. 
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possible rating on the Saffir-Simpson rating scale, with maximum sustained winds of 178 mph.15 
The National Hurricane Center’s Hurricane Katrina Special Advisory No. 22 issued at 7:00 a.m. 
CDT began with the following words: “…Katrina…now a potentially catastrophic Category 5 
Hurricane…”16 Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 23, issued at 10:00 a.m. CDT offered even 
bleaker news stating: “potentially catastrophic Hurricane Katrina…even stronger…headed for 
Northern Gulf Coast…maximum sustained winds have reached to near 175 mph…with higher 
gusts…Katrina is a potentially catastrophic Category Five hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson 
scale,”17 The dire warnings continued to get progressively worse throughout the rest of the day.18 
Finally, at approximately 10:00 a.m. CDT Mayor Nagin ordered the mandatory evacuation of the 
entire city of New Orleans exempting hotels from the evacuation order because airlines had 
already cancelled all flights leaving New Orleans. In the press conference Nagin stated:   
“We’re facing the storm most of us have feared.”19 [Emphasis added] 
The reports issued on Monday, August 29, 2005, found Katrina moving onshore the 
southern coast of Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, near Empire and Buras, and reaching the 
Louisiana-Mississippi border by early afternoon.20 Shortly after 8:00 a.m. CDT the New Orleans 
office of the National Weather Service issued a flash flood warning for Orleans and St. Bernard 
Parishes. The arrival and passage of Katrina resulted in flooding of the Greater New Orleans 
metropolitan area beginning as early as 4:30 a.m. CDT with minor breaches on the Industrial 
                                                     
15 U.S. Senate, Commerce Committee, NOAA National Hurricane Center Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline 
Aug. 23-31, 2005 <http://commerce.senate.gove/pdf/katrina_NOAA_Timeline.pdf> 
16 NOAA National Hurricane Center 22. 
17 Ibid. 23. 
18 Ibid. 23A, 24, 24A, 25. 
19 Press Conference “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Orleans Levee District Press Conference” CNN. 
August 28, 2005  
20 NOAA National Hurricane Center 26A. 
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Canal; failure of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO)21 levees in St. Bernard Parish (5:00 
a.m.); storm surges overtopping the levees on the East and West Banks of the Mississippi River 
and both sides of the Industrial Canal (6:10–6:30 a.m.); breaches of the levees on the west side of 
the Industrial Canal (7:30 a.m.); two major breaches on the east side of the southern end of the 
Industrial Canal (7:45 a.m.); overtopping of the embankment at the foot of the Orleans Canal 
(8:15 a.m.); overtopping of a one-mile stretch of the levee behind Lakefront Airport (8:30 a.m.); 
a major breach on the east side of the London Avenue Canal near Mirabeau (9:30 AM); a major 
breach one hundred fifty yards long on the east side of the 17th Street Canal (9:45 a.m.); and a 
major breach on the west side of the London Avenue Canal near Robert E. Lee Boulevard (10:30 
a.m.).22  
By 10:00 a.m. “…the eye of the storm passed just slightly to the east of New Orleans and 
…threw unusually severe wind loads and storm surges on the flood protection systems.”23 By 
noon Katrina was reported as “still powerful but gradually weakening as it moves farther 
inland.”24 The damage was done. Katrina was a “force majeure” that began a new chapter in the 
history of New Orleans. 25 The levee and floodwall failures were later determined to be the result 
of compounded long term and often repeated errors by Corps of Engineer personnel. 
                                                     
21 “MRGO” is an acronym for Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. MRGO is a 66-mile channel that provides a shorter 
route between the Gulf of Mexico and New Orleans’ inner harbor. It is intended to be useful both as a shorter route 
than the twists of the Mississippi River and for deep-draft vessels that cannot fit through canal locks of the Industrial 
Canal. The canal extends northwest from deep water in the Gulf of Mexico to the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal at 
the Port of New Orleans. 
22 Ivor Van Heerden and Mike Bryan The Storm (New York: Viking, 2006) 92-94.  
23 Seed, et al, Investigation of the Performance of the New Orleans Flood Protection Systems in Hurricane Katrina 
on August 29, 2005, Independent Levee Investigation Final Report July 31, 2006, F-27. U.C. Berkeley 2006 
<hppt://www.ce.Berkeley.edu/~new_Orleans/report/CH_1.pdf>. 
24 NOAA National Hurricane Center Hurricane 27A. 
25 An Act of God. 
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Chapter III 
The Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans; Orleans Levee District; and 
The United States Army Corps of Engineers 
 
             “Drainage has been a major concern since the founding of the city in the 18th century, 
remaining an important factor in the history of New Orleans through today.”26 The low-lying 
topography of New Orleans offered a unique challenge to city developers. Solving the drainage 
problems of New Orleans has never been a simple matter. In 1893, the city government formed 
the Drainage Advisory Board to come up with better solutions to the city’s drainage problems. In 
1899, a bond issue floated and a 2 mil per dollar property tax approved which funded and 
founded the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans.   
Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans 
The Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans is a political subdivision27 of the state of 
Louisiana with limited scope and powers, created by a special act adopted by the Louisiana 
legislature on August 8, 1899.28  Specifically the act states:  
Creation and organization of sewerage and water board: 
A. (1) the public water system, the public sewerage system, and the public 
drainage system of the city of New Orleans shall be constructed, controlled, 
maintained, and operated by a sewerage and water board.29  
 
The Legislature’s delegation of authority and responsibility to the Sewerage and Water  
Board did not include any responsibility for flood control system(s), levees, floodwalls, 
floodgates or related appurtenances. Those responsibilities statutorily lie with the Orleans Levee 
District.   The Sewerage and Water Board consists of fourteen (14) members composed of the 
                                                     
26 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, History of the New Orleans Drainage System, 1893-1996. Chapter 4 (1997) 
<http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/history/NO_Drainage/NO_Drain_chap4a.pdf.>. 
27 Louisiana Constitution, Art. VI. Section 44(2) defining “political subdivision” to mean “a parish, municipality, 
and any other unit of local government, including a school board and a special district, authorized by law to perform 
governmental functions.” 
28 Acts 1899, La. Legislature, Ex. Sess., No. 6 § 8. 
29 Louisiana Statutes Annotated, Revised Statutes, Title 33 § 4071.  
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mayor, the two at large members of the council, one of the district councilmen selected by the 
council, two members of the board of liquidation, city debt, appointed by the mayor on 
recommendation of the board of liquidation, city debt, and seven citizens appointed by the mayor 
on recommendation of the city council, two from the city at large and one from each of the five 
councilmanic districts of the city.30
In the early-twentieth century Sewerage and Water Board Superintendent George W. Earl 
summarized the major technical difficulties confronting engineers concerning New Orleans’ 
drainage problems: “First of all, New Orleans had to face the problem of overflows from the 
Mississippi River and from tidal waters in Lake Pontchartrain, and the construction of levees, 
first along the river bank, because high water in the river was above the level of even the highest 
land in the city, and later, in the rear, to prevent high lake tides from backing into the lower part 
of the inhabited area, followed. Then came surface ditches and canals to drain the storm water 
into the tidal bayous, which often rose to a level which precluded much relief by such method, 
since only a small area of land along the river bank in New Orleans is higher than the high tides 
of the lake, and the ditches and canals were even more or less filled by tidal water and gave very 
inadequate drainage even for the highest portion of the city. Rainfall of great intensity was of 
frequent occurrence, and these falling on a ground which was already saturated made the need 
for better drainage imperative…”31
The Sewerage and Water Board vested with the statutory responsibility for drainage of 
the city of New Orleans is responsible for pumping rainfall and floodwaters into the drainage 
canals, or outfall canals, connected to Lake Pontchartrain. Vast pumping stations throughout the 
                                                     
30 LSA – R.S. 33:4071A(1)(a) – (c). 
31 Hon. Martin Behrman, Mayor, New Orleans, “New Orleans. A History of Three Great Public Utilities, Sewerage, 
Water and Drainage, and their influence upon the Health and Progress of a Big City,” Convention of League of 
American Municipalities, Milwaukee, Wis., Sept. 29, 1914. 
<http://www.penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/Places/America/United_States/Louisiana/New_Orleans/tex
ts/Behrman*.html> 
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city channel rain and floodwaters through an intricate network of subsurface and surface canals 
leading to the outfall canals connected to Lake Pontchartrain.  The outfall canals are bordered by 
a system of levees and floodwalls. Under the statute that created the Sewerage and Water Board, 
any property the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans deemed necessary for the sewerage, 
water or drainage system for the city was acquired through expropriation proceedings in the 
name of the City of New Orleans. The building project finally got off the ground following the 
yellow fever epidemic of 1898.  
There are eighteen historic and present day man-made canals in and around New Orleans 
comprising the drainage system designed to keep New Orleans dry. Three drainage canals 
contributed to the widespread flooding following Katrina as a result of the failure of levees and 
floodwalls, the 17th Street, London Avenue and Industrial Canals.  
Collier’s Weekly, in an article titled “A Wonderful Drainage System” noted in its issue 
published September 7, 1901, that: “New Orleans is building the largest, costliest and most 
elaborate drainage and sewerage system in the world.”32  
The Sewerage and Water Board never designed, constructed, maintained, owned, 
improved or had any responsibility for levees, floodwalls or other flood-control appurtenances 
that form any part of the hurricane protection system. Those duties and responsibilities are 
clearly outside of its statutory mandate and lie squarely on the shoulders of the Orleans Levee 
District and Corps of Engineers. 
Orleans Levee District 
The Board of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District is a corporate body 
politic, a special state agency or subdivision of the state created by the Louisiana legislature in 
                                                     
32 A Wonderful Drainage System, Collier’s Weekly, Vol. XXVII No. 23, September 7, 1901. 
 11
1890 for the purpose of protecting the city of New Orleans from floods. 33 From its inception 
through 2006, the Orleans Levee District was the governmental body having exclusive 
responsibility for levees under its jurisdiction and control.  This includes the floodwall systems 
in Orleans Parish “to insure the thorough and adequate protection of the lands of the district from 
damage by flood…for the adequate drainage control of the district.”  
Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 38 § 307 provides that the Board of Commissioners of 
the Orleans Levee District has the full and exclusive right and jurisdiction over the levees: 
§307. Orleans Levee District; powers of board of commissioners 
A. (1) The board of commissioners of the Orleans Levee District shall have and 
exercise all and singular the powers now conferred upon that board by law, as 
well as such powers as are herein granted. The board shall have full and 
exclusive right, jurisdiction, power and authority to locate, relocate, construct, 
maintain, extend, and improve levees, embankments, seawalls, jetties, 
breakwaters, water-basins, and other works in relation to such 
projects…[emphasis added.] 34
 
The courts have upheld these exclusive duties and responsibilities. “A levee board is a 
creature or organization of the state brought into existence for the purposes of discharging the 
state’s duties of flood protection.”35 The court has also found that the “…Orleans Levee 
District…maintains the hurricane protection levees in the New Orleans area…”36 Any land 
owned by the state used in conjunction with levee construction or use is transferred to the 
Orleans Levee District.37 Thus ownership of the levees lies with the Orleans Levee District.38
Over the years politically appointed board members took on ambitious non-flood related 
building projects including the building of the Bohemia Spillway between the river and the Gulf 
                                                     
33 Acts 1890, No. 93, §§ 1–8; LSA-R.S. 38 §§ 301-512. Acts 1890, No. 93, §§ 1-8. 
34 LSA-R.S. 38:307(A)(1). 
35 Bd. of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 496 So.2d 281, 289 (La. 1986) 
36 Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Robertson, 713 F. 2d 1151, 1154 (La. 5 Cir. 1983). 
37 LSA-R.S. 38:336A. 
38 Ibid., § 307(A)(1). 
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of Mexico, Lakefront Airport, South Shore Harbor and the Orleans Marina, Lakeshore Drive, the 
Senator “Ted” Hickey Bridge spanning the Industrial Canal, five major subdivisions (Lake Vista, 
East & West Lakeshore, Lake Terrace and Lake Oaks) and miles of lakefront recreational 
areas.39
“Levee systems of the size needed to protect the New Orleans area are often collaborative 
efforts between federal and local government.”40 The Orleans Levee District is responsible for 
the maintenance of 129 miles of levees and floodwalls, 189 floodgates, 97 flood valves, and two 
flood control structures. To enhance flood protection the Orleans Levee District and Corps of 
Engineers participate and cost share with others, including the Sewerage and Water Board and 
East Jefferson Levee District, in several joint flood protection projects relative to the Lake 
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Plan.41 Neither the Orleans Levee District nor 
any other local entity had final authority or accountability for coordination of the various flood-
defense systems.  
The Corps of Engineers built most of the current levees using mostly federal funds.42 
Colonel Eugene S. Witherspoon, District Engineer, reported in 1986, after more than 20 years in 
delays and disputes the project “is an excellent example of a federal/local partnership that is 
working to offer hurricane flood protection to the residents of our area.”43  
Tropical Storm Frances and Hurricane Georges in September 1998 struck the Gulf Coast 
regions with a vengeance significantly testing the integrity of the hurricane protection system. 
                                                     
39 Bruce Eggler “Orleans Levee Board is History,” Times~Picayune, New Orleans, LA., Dec. 28, 2006. 
40 Ibid. IPET Final Report July 31, 2006, 4 –22. 
41 Orleans Levee District Statement of Purpose.www.orleanslevee.com/Mission%20Steatment.htm. 
42 Ann Carns, “Long Before Flood, New Orleans Was Prime for Leaks,” The Wall Street Journal, [New York] Vol. 
246, No. 111, Nov. 25, 2005. 
43 Eugene S. Witherspoon, “Construction Moves Ahead on All Fronts,” quoted in Notes for Briefing on Lake 
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project; Orleans Levee Board Press Conference, May 30, 1986 (Lake Pontchartrain file); 
Information Bulletin (Spr. 1986): 8; “Water Resources Development Act of 1986 – It Was a Very Good Year for 
NOD,” Information Bulletin (Win/Spr. 1987): 3-5. 
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The system passed the test with minimal damage and inconvenience. In April 1999 according to 
the Corps of Engineers the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project44 alone 
prevented an estimated $749 million in damages, exceeding the total cost of the project as of 
1998. This was only a small percent of the cumulative total of $9.69 billion saved since 1983 by 
the Lake Pontchartrain project alone. “Our project not only worked, it demonstrated its 
worthiness as a public investment in dollars” proclaimed Colonel William L. Conner, District 
Engineer who soon thereafter retired from the military. 45   
Six years later Hurricane Katrina ripped the heart out of the Lake Pontchartrain, 
Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project. The inadequacy of the levees and 
floodwalls showed the world that the project constructed under the direction of, and funded by, 
the Army Corps of Engineers failed to do what it was designed to do. The catastrophic collapse 
of the hurricane protection system on August 29, 2005, proved that both Colonels Witherspoon 
and Conner were absolutely wrong in their assessment about the success of the project in 1986 
and 1999. Following Hurricane Katrina we learned after three independent and thorough 
investigations that the projects fatal flaws might have been prevented. 
 Much has been written about the cause(s) of the failure of the hurricane protection 
system especially the levees and floodwalls. The investigation and reports by the Independent 
Levee Investigation Team funded by the National Science Foundation, Interagency Performance 
Evaluation Task Force,46 and Team Louisiana Report commissioned by the Louisiana 
                                                     
44 Pub. L. No. 89-298 Section 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077; fn 2 Flood Control Act of 1965 
45 William L.Conner, “Corps and Sponsors prevent $749 million of Pontchartrain-area Damage by 1998’s 
Hurricane Georges,” USACENOD News Release, Apr. 16. 1999 
<www.mvn.usace.army.mil/PAO/releases/hurricane.HTM>. 
46 “Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System.U.S.Amy 
Corps of Engineers,” Final Draft, June 1, 2006 <https://ipet.wes.army.mil> 
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Department of Transportation and Development,47 have filled volumes to date. Their respective 
findings blame the federal government in using data that was out dated, ill conceived, patently 
incorrect and flawed. The 1965 congressional mandate issued to the Corps to develop effective 
plans to protect the Greater New Orleans area against the “most severe combination of 
meteorological conditions reasonably expected” was for naught. Copies of the executive 
summaries of the reports are in the appendix. 
United States Army Corps of Engineers 
 
In the aftermath of the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, Congress gave the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers supervision and control of design and construction of large-scale flood 
control projects to protect the Mississippi Valley from river flooding. The Flood Control Act of 
1928 became law during the administration of U.S. President Herbert Hoover and has been 
frequently amended.48  
Hurricanes have long been a threat to U.S. Coastal regions especially to Louisiana. 
Approximately 165 hurricanes have struck Louisiana since 1559, “an average of more than one 
storm every three years.”49 “Under the Flood Control Acts of 1962, and other legislation, the 
Corps developed plans to protect vulnerable areas from the damaging flood surges that 
accompany hurricanes and other tropical storms. Because the most vulnerable areas in the New 
Orleans District are adjacent to wetland areas environmental concerns became even more evident 
with hurricane protection projects than with other more established Corps projects.”50
                                                     
47 Ivor Ll. Van Heerden, et al., “The Failure of the New Orleans Levee System During Hurricane Katrina.” Team 
Louisiana, Dec. 18, 2006 http://www.publichealth.hurricane.lsu.edu/TeamLA.htm. 
48 33 USC 701 et seq. 
49 Damon Manders, “The Bayou Builders: (Draft) A History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans 
District, 1976 – 2000”, Aug. 2002 p. 86. 
50 Ibid.  
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Following Hurricane Betsy’s landfall (September 9, 1965), at Grand Isle, Louisiana, a  
Category 4 hurricane, the dawn of a new day for flood protection projects in the New Orleans 
area shined brightly, or so we thought. Betsy was the fourth costliest storm in the United States, 
after Andrew (1992), Hugo (1989) and Camille (1969).51 Katrina now tops the list. 
Reasoning that the greatest threat to the New Orleans area was from hurricane-induced 
storm surges, waves, and rainfall, Congress first authorized construction of the Lake 
Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act of 
1965 to provide hurricane protection to areas around Lake Pontchartrain.52 The legislation 
provided direction and funds for a comprehensive series of flood control structures, concrete 
floodwalls, and levees. The project was initiated to insure that the city’s levees and floodwalls 
could withstand a direct hit by a hurricane of at least a fast-moving Category 3 intensity that 
might strike the coastal Louisiana region one in 200-300 years.  
Although federally authorized the project was a joint federal, state, and local effort with 
the federal government paying 70% of the costs and the state and local interests (partners) paying 
30%.  The Corps of Engineers was responsible for project design and construction and the local 
interests were responsible for maintenance of the levees and flood control structures. “The Corps 
had several non-federal partners in the venture: the Orleans Levee District and East Jefferson 
Levee District, and Sewerage and Water Board. The levee districts maintained the canals while 
the Sewerage and Water Board maintained the pump stations and controlled the discharge into 
the drainage canals.”53  Original cost estimates when the project was first designed was $85 
million and expected to take about 13 years to complete. There were many setbacks for various 
                                                     
51 Eric S. Blake, Max Mayfield, Edward N. Rappaport and Christopher W. Landsea, “The Deadliest, Costliest, and 
Most Intense United States Hurricanes from 1900 to 2000 (And Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts)” 
NOAA Technical Memorandum, National Weather Service, Tropical Prediction Center, Oct. 1, 2001. 
52 Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965. Pub. L. 
No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077. 
53 Seed, Vol 1, Chap. 4, Section 4.7.7, 4-22.  
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projects in the overall plan for flood protection including design changes caused by technical 
issues, environmental concerns, legal challenges and local opposition to portions of the project 
by the Orleans Levee District and Sewerage and Water Board.54   
“As of early 2005, the project was not expected to be completed until 2015 – nearly 50 
years after it was first authorized – and at a cost of about $738 million…”55 [Emphasis Added]. 
In the weeks following Hurricane Katrina public outcry for levee board reform was 
deafening statewide and especially in the Greater New Orleans area. In the 1st Extraordinary 
Session (2005) of the Louisiana legislature lawmakers with overwhelming public and private 
support accomplished something that reformers unsuccessfully had tried to do for decades, rein 
in the state’s levee boards.  
Created by Act 2006, No. 43, newly configured levee districts statewide were given 
life.56 The act became operative upon the passing and adoption of the Constitutional Amendment 
to Article VI, Sections 38(A)(1) and 39 and added Article VI, Section 38.1 to the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1974.57 The voters of Orleans Parish and across the state overwhelmingly voted 
in favor of the proposed reform measures in a statewide election September 30, 2006. Eighty-one 
percent (81%) of the voters statewide and ninety-four percent (94%) of the voters in Orleans 
Parish voted for the proposed constitutional amendment. 58 The Constitutional Amendment took 
effect January 1, 2007. The newly authorized Orleans Levee District59 replaced the former Board 
                                                     
54 Anu Mittal, “Army Corps of Engineers – Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project,” 
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Washington D.C. (GAO Report-05-1050T), Sept. 28, 2005. 
55 Ibid. 
56 La. Legislature, Acts 2006, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 1, contingent upon approval of constitutional amendments at a 
statewide election scheduled to be held September 30, 2006. 
57 La. Const. of 1974, art. VI, §§ 38(A)(1), 39; art. VI, § 38.1. 
58 La. Sec. of State, Official Election Results, Results for Election Date: 9/30/06. 
<http://www.sos.louisiana.gov:8090/cgibin/?rqstyp=elcms4&rqsdta=09302006>.  
59 LSA-R.S. 38:291K; LSA-Const. Art. 6, Sect. 38(A)(1), 38.1 & 39. 
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of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District60 with narrow and distinct authority for regional 
flood protection responsibilities within Orleans Parish. The Orleans Levee District’s non-flood 
related assets and activities, once the treasure chest of local political power brokers, became the 
responsibility of the state Division of Administration61
                                                     
60 LSA-R.S. 38:1231 Et seq. LSA-Const. Art. 4, Sect. 4.  
61 Ibid. Eggler. 
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Chapter IV 
State Statutes Governing Emergencies and Disasters in Louisiana 
 
The Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act became 
law June 22, 1993.62 The act recognized the “ …existing possibilities of the occurrence of 
emergencies and disasters of unprecedented size, and destructiveness, resulting from …flood 
…or other natural or manmade causes…”63 Katrina surely met and exceeded the definition of a 
“disaster” of unprecedented size with its massive destruction causing flooding throughout 80% 
of the city of New Orleans.64 The Act pertains to civil defense, emergency preparedness and 
provides for state and local civil defense and emergency preparedness agencies and the 
organization, powers, duties, functions, responsibilities, personnel and funding thereof.   
Military, Naval, and Veterans’ Affairs: Civil Defense Agency 
The research led to the discovery of a number of laws found in Title 29 of the Louisiana 
Revised States governing “Military, Naval, and Veterans’ Affairs,” one of which created a State 
Civil Defense Agency.”65 It is here that we find the purpose of the law in § 601: 
§ 601. Policy and purpose 
A.Because of the existing possibility of the occurrence of disasters of  
unprecedented size and destructiveness resulting from enemy attack, 
sabotage, or other hostile action, or from fire, flood, earthquake, or other 
natural or manmade causes, and in order to ensure that preparations of 
this state will be adequate to deal with such disasters, and generally to 
provide for the common defense and to protect the public peace, health, 
and safety, and to preserve the lives and property of people of the state of 
Louisiana, it is hereby found and declared to be necessary:   
 
  
(1)To create a Louisiana Civil Defense Agency, and to authorize  
                                                     
62 LSA-R.S. 29:721-738. 
63 Ibid. § 722A. 
64 Ibid. § 723(1). 
65 LSA-R.S. 29:601-617 
 19
the creation of local organizations for civil defense in the political 
subdivisions of the state; 
 
(2) To confer upon the governor and upon the executive heads or 
 governing bodies of the political subdivisions of the state the 
emergency powers provided in this Chapter…66  
 
In an effort to protect individuals acting in furtherance of the purposes of § 601 the 
legislature included an immunity provision insulating those engaged in civil defense activities 
from liability except in the case of willful misconduct. The provision states:  
§ 613. Immunity of personnel 
A. Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof, nor other agencies, nor, 
except in the case of willful misconduct, the agents, employees, or 
representative of any of them, engaged in any civil defense activities, while 
complying with or attempting to comply with this Chapter or any rule or 
regulation promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall be 
liable for death of or any injury to persons, or damage to property, as a result 
of such activity.67    
 
 The common fear of that era, the 1950s, was the possibility of enemy attack from within 
or afar following the end of WWII in addition to common risks from fire, flood, earthquake, or 
other natural or manmade causes.   
Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974 
 In 1974 legislation signed by the governor, Act No. 636, created the Louisiana Disaster 
Act of 1974.68 The act applied to man-made and natural disasters occurring in the state of 
Louisiana. Section § 704 of that act defined the term “disaster” as follows:  
“Disaster” means occurrence or imminent threat of widespread or severe damage, 
injury, or loss of life or property resulting from any natural or man-made cause, 
including but not limited to hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind 
driven water, tidal wave, earthquake, landslide, mudslide, fire, explosion, hostile 
military actions, or other disasters;”69
                                                     
66 LSA-R.S. 29:601. Added by Acts 1950, No. 38, § 1. Repealed by Acts 1993, No. 770, § 1 
67 Ibid. § 613. 
68 LSA-R.S. 29:701-716 
69 Ibid. § 704(1) 
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Section 705 gave the governor authority to declare by executive order a disaster 
emergency stating in the executive order or proclamation: (a) the nature of the disaster; (b) the 
area or areas threatened; and (c) the conditions which have brought it about or make possible 
termination of the state of disaster emergency.70 Section 706 gave like power(s) to the principal 
executive officer of a local government subdivision to declare a local disaster emergency for a 
period not in excess of seven days.71 A state Department of Civil Defense and Emergency 
Preparedness was established under the adjutant general replacing the Louisiana Civil Defense 
Agency created in 1950. The new department was to be headed by a director appointed by and 
who served at the pleasure of the governor.72 The 1974 act updated the 1950s era law with 
modern day language. For almost twenty years the act went substantially unchanged but for 
minor amendments in 1974,73 1975,74 1983, 751984,76 and 1987.77 The law remained in effect 
until it was repealed in 1993.78
Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act. 
Times change and the world was a much different place when the legislature convened 
for the 1993 Regular Session. According to official records maintained by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)79 between November 1974 and February 1993, there 
were 23 major disaster declarations all of which involved hurricanes, tropical storms, tornadoes, 
severe storms, heavy rains and flooding. Since 1953 all major disaster declarations in the state of 
                                                     
70 Ibid. § 705(B)  
71 Ibid. § 706(A). 
72 Ibid. § 707. 
73 La. Acts 1974, No. 636 § 1. 
74 La. Acts 1975, no. 645 § 1. 
75 La. Acts 1983, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 1, § 6; LSA-R.S. 24:253. 
76 La. Acts 1984, No. 173, § 1, eff. June 25, 1984. 
77 La. Acts 1987, No. 761 § 1 eff. July 16, 1987. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. Stafford Act. 
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Louisiana but one involved flooding, hurricanes, and/or severe storms 80 Also on February 26th 
that year Middle Eastern terrorists detonated a car bomb in the underground parking garage 
below Tower One of the World Trade Center in New York City. The bomb killed six and injured 
1,042 people. The terrorists intended for the bomb blast to devastate the foundation of the North 
Tower, causing it to collapse on its twin. As we all know that attempt failed. However less than 
ten years later terrorists were successful in causing the collapse of both towers on September 11, 
2001 when two hijacked commercial airliners were flown directly into each tower. 
The legislature considered sweeping changes to the Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974. 
Mindful of the actions taken by first responders to the World Trade Center following the 
bombing incident the legislature looked to current laws still on the books, especially in the area 
of immunity.  
The immunity provision found in Title 29 § 613 was the starting point for change. Since 
the Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974 had no specific immunity protection the legislature amended 
and reenacted § 613, under a new heading with broader language. Section 735 in the proposed 
Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act provided for:   
“immunity of personnel employed by the state, political subdivisions or agencies  
thereof…engaged in any homeland security and emergency preparedness      
activities, while complying with or attempting to comply with this Chapter or  
any rule or regulation.”  
                                                     
80 “Louisiana Disaster History,” <http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters_state.fema?id=22>. 
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The legislature repealed the Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974 enacting a law commonly 
referred to as the “Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act.”81  
Louisiana House of Representatives  - Legislative History  
The legislature repealed the Louisiana Disaster of 1974 in 1993. During the 1993 Regular 
Session Representative H. B. “Hunt” Downer filed House Bill No. 1312 (HB 1312) to: (a) 
amend and reenact Chapter 6, Title 29 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, comprised of 
R.S. 29:701 through 716 relative to civil defense and emergency preparedness; (b) provide for a 
state civil defense and emergency preparedness agency; (c) provide for the organization, powers, 
duties, functions, responsibilities, personnel, and funding thereof; and (d) provide for related 
matters. The intended purpose was explicitly stated in Section 722: 
§ 722. Purpose 
A. Because of the existing possibility of the occurrence of emergencies and 
disasters of unprecedented size and destructiveness resulting from terrorist 
events, enemy attack, sabotage, or other hostile action, or from fire, flood, 
earthquake, or other natural or manmade causes, and in order to ensure that 
preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with such emergencies or 
disasters, and in order to detect, prevent, prepare for, investigate, respond to, or 
recover from these events, and generally to preserve the lives and property of the 
people of the state of Louisiana, it is hereby found and declared to be necessary… 
 
                        (4) To reduce vulnerability of people and communities of this state to damage, 
injury, and loss of life and property resulting from natural or man-made 
catastrophes, riots, acts of terrorism, or hostile military or paramilitary action. 
 
(5) To prepare for prompt and efficient evacuation, rescue, care, and treatment of 
persons victimized or threatened by disasters or emergency. 
 
(6) To provide a setting conducive to the rapid and orderly start of restoration and 
rehabilitation of persons and property affected by emergencies or disasters. 
 
(7) To authorize and provide for cooperation in emergency or disaster prevention, 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. 
A.  It is further declared to be the purpose of this Chapter and the policy of the  
                                                     
81 LSA-R.S. 29:721. 
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state of Louisiana that all homeland security and emergency preparedness 
functions of the state be coordinated to the maximum extent possible with the 
comparable functions of the federal government, other states and localities, and 
private agencies of every type, to the end that the most effective preparation and 
use may be made of the resources and facilities available for dealing with any 
emergency or disaster that may occur. 
 
B. It is further declared to b the purpose of this Chapter and the policy of the 
state of Louisiana that all homeland security and emergency preparedness 
functions of the state shall follow the principles outlined in the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) or its successor. 82
 
            According to the legislative calendar, on April 12, 1993, the bill was read on the floor of 
the House and referred to the Committee on Judiciary.83 On May 11, 1993, Representative 
Joseph Toomy, chairman of the committee called the committee to order in a committee room in 
the State Capitol. Members of the committee included Representatives John Siracusa (Vice- 
Chairman), Avery Alexander, C.E. “Peppi” Bruneau, Charles Riddle, C.O. Simpkins and Jack 
Smith, in addition to Toomy. All members were present for the discussion of HB 1312. 
Representative Downer distributed a draft of a proposed substitute bill for HB 1312, which 
renamed the Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974 as the Louisiana Assistance and Disaster Act. The 
act would have the effect of granting more specific powers to the governor, adjutant general, 
military department, and local governing authorities in dealing with emergencies and disasters.  
Ansel M. “Buddy” Stroud, Jr., State Adjutant General and Colonel Bill Croft, in their respective 
positions of Director and Assistant Director of the State Office of Emergency Preparedness, 
spoke in favor of the bill.     
Following Hurricane Andrew (1992) the Office of Emergency Preparedness determined 
revisions of the Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974 were necessary. Among other things, the 
revisions addressed emergency preparedness for all hazards and more importantly would provide 
                                                     
82 LSA-R.S. 29:722(A)(B) & (C). 
83 La. House of Representatives, 7th Day’s Proceedings - April 12, 1993. House Journal 61.  
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for the Adjutant General to be the director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness rather than a 
gubernatorial appointee. The suggested revisions also stipulated that only the parish president or 
his equivalent could declare a local disaster or emergency, thereby giving the parish president the 
same authority as the governor under the proposed law.  
After minor amendments, HB 1312 was reported by substitute House Bill No. 2084 (HB 
2084) by a vote of 5-0.84 HB 2084 also sponsored by Representative Downer provided 
comprehensive changes to HB No. 1312.85 The most significant change in HB 2084 was the 
inclusion of the immunity language that was contained in R.S. 29:613.86 That language provided:  
“one who is engaged in emergency preparedness activities, and complying with 
the rules, shall not be liable for the death or injury to persons and property as a 
result of such activity.”87  
 
Specifically the proposed language stated:  
 
§ 735. Immunity of Personnel  
 
C. (1) Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof, nor other 
agencies, nor except in the case of willful misconduct, the agents’ 
employees or representative of any of them engaged in any homeland 
security and emergency preparedness activities, while complying with 
or attempting to comply with this Chapter or any rule or regulation 
promulgated pursuant to the provision of this Chapter shall be liable 
for the death of or any injury to persons or damage to property as a 
result of such activity.88 
 
The legislative history notes that Representative Toomy submitted a report on the bill 
(HB 1312) reflecting that the bill was reported by substitute (HB 2084) with the committee 
                                                     
84La. House of Representatives, House Committee on Judiciary, Min. of Mtg, 1993 Reg. Sess., May 11, 1993. 
85 H.B. 2084, HLSX 93-2854, Engrossed, Regular Session, 1993, Digest prepared by House Legis. Services. 
86 LSA-R.S. 29:613. 
87 Ibid. 
88 LSA-R.S. 29:735A(1). 
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voting 5-0 in favor of the bill.89 On second reading the bill was read by title, substitute title 
adopted and HB 2084 lies over in same order of business, noted as a substitute for HB 1312.90  
HB 2084 was read by title and on motion of Representative Toomy ordered engrossed, 
passed to a third reading and under the rules, placed on the regular calendar.91  On May 20th HB 
2084 was on the house calendar for a third reading when it was amended and passed with a vote 
of 96 yeas, 3 nays. Following passage HB 2084 was referred to the Louisiana State Senate.92
Louisiana Senate  - Legislative History  
Senator Dennis Bagneris handled the bill and obtained a suspension of the rules to take 
up House Bills and Joint Resolutions just received from the House. Among the bills taken up 
was HB 2084 and referred to the Committee on Judiciary B.93  
The Senate Committee on Judiciary B met on May 28, 1993. Senator Bankston, the 
chairman, called the meeting to order. Representative Downer sponsor of both bills (HB 1312 
and HB 2084) addressed the committee explaining the need for the legislation. He said the 
Louisiana Disaster Act of 197494 had never been updated. Following Hurricane Andrew (1992) 
he found the act said nothing about hurricanes or authorities being allowed to actually declare an 
emergency prior to the occurrence of a natural disaster in order for the state’s resources to 
mobilize and assist the state or local government agency. Under the act the disaster came first 
and then the declaration of the emergency. The new law would provide ability for the Governor, 
or local government representative(s), to first declare a state of emergency in light of a perceived 
actual or apparent natural or man made disaster and then invoke the provisions of law enabling 
the state or political subdivisions to act in response thereto.  
                                                     
 89 Ibid. La. House of Representatives, May 11, 1993. House Journal 52.  
90 Ibid. House Journal 53.  
91 Ibid. House Journal 10.  
92 Ibid. House Journal 49.  
93 La. State Senate, 1993 Regular Sess. 29th day’s proceedings – May 23, 1993, Senate Journal 4.  
94 Ibid., La. Disaster Act of 1974. 
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After a colloquy between Representative Downer and members of the committee, minor 
amendments were adopted without objection. HB 2084 was reported favorably with 
amendments.  In closing remarks Representative Downer urged the members of the committee to 
be vigilant when dealing with emergencies in their respective districts and encouraged the 
members to give us some feedback so that the legislation could be updated as need be.95
The Senate committee took up HB 2084 for the second time on May 28th. HB 2084, 
reported with amendments, was adopted. Under Joint Rule No. 3 of the Rules of the Senate, the 
amended bill was read by title and referred to the Legislative Bureau. The Legislative Bureau is a 
group composed of two members of the Legislature, one selected by each house, and ex- officio, 
the secretary of the Senate, the Clerk of the House, and unofficially the Executive Director of the 
Legislative Bureau.96
         Senator Bagneris on behalf of the Legislative Bureau submitted a report to the Senate that 
included the action taken with respect to HB 2084 on May 29, 1993. The Legislative Bureau 
reported a minor amendment. The Legislative Bureau amendments were adopted and the 
Concurrent Resolutions and Bills and Joint Resolutions, including HB 2084, were read by title 
and passed to a third reading on motion of Senator Bagneris.97
        On June 2, 1993 HB 2084 on third reading and final passage was taken up on the floor of 
the Senate The bill was read by title and moved for passage by Senator Bean. After roll call vote, 
37 yeas, 0 nays, 2 members absent, the Chair declared the bill was passed. The title was read and 
adopted. Senator Bean moved to reconsider the vote and laid the motion on the table.98
                                                     
95 La. State Senate, Senate Committee on Judiciary B, Minutes, May 28, 1993 
96 Rules of the Louisiana Legislature: Joint Rule No. 3; House Rules 7.20, 8.19 and 11.4; Senate Rule 10.15; 
<http://www.legis.state.la.us/glossary2.htm>. 
97 La. State Senate 1993 Reg. Sess. 35th day’s proceedings – May 29, 1993, Senate Journal 29  
98 La. State Senate 1993 Reg. Sess. 39th day’s proceedings – June 2, 1993, Senate Journal 38   
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The House of Representatives received a message from the Senate stating “To the 
Honorable Speaker and Members of the House of Representatives: I am directed to inform your 
Honorable body that the Senate has passed the following House Bills: …House Bill No. 2084, 
reported with amendments. /s/ Michael S. Baer, III, Secretary of the Senate.”99
Representative Ackal moved to take up House Bills and Joint Resolutions returned from the 
Senate with amendments. Among the bills considered HB 2084 substitute for HB 1312. The bill 
was taken up with the amendments proposed by the Senate. On motion of Representative 
Downer a vote was ordered on the concurrence of the amendments proposed by the Senate. The 
amendments were unanimously approved.100  
Representative Francis Thompson, on June 3, 1993, on behalf of the Committee on 
Enrollment, submitted a report to the Speaker and Members of the House of Representatives 
that: “…House Bills have been properly enrolled…HB 2084.” 
The House reported to the Senate that the Speaker signed HB 2084 in a message on June 7, 
1993.101 The bill was then signed by the Senate President and taken to the Governor for 
executive approval.102 The Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and 
Disaster Act became law on June 22, 1993.103  
 Prior to the 2003 Regular Session of the legislature Representative Downer pre-filed House Bill 
942 (HB 942). HB 942 sought to amend the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency 
Assistance and Disaster Act. The bill was provisionally referred to the Committee on Judiciary 
before the legislature met. The bill was pre-filed by Downer. When the session began HB 942 
                                                     
99 Ibid. House Journal 105, 106  
100 Ibid. House Journal 5,23  
101 La. State Senate 1993 Reg. Sess. 42nd day’s proceedings – June 7, 1993, Senate Journal 49-50 
102 Ibid. House Journal 54,57   
103 La. Acts 1993 No. 800 
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was read and referred to the Committee on Judiciary. The bill sailed through the House with 
minor amendments, passed unanimously (100 yeas, 0 nays) and reported to the Senate.  
The Senate referred HB 942 to the Legislative Bureau where no amendments were made.  
The bill was reported back to the Senate for final passage and passed by the Senate (35 yeas, 1 
nay). Act 40 (HB 942) signed by the Governor became law on May 23, 2003.104 Section 735, the 
immunity provision, wholly intact but for the addition of the words “homeland security.”  
During the 2005 1st Extraordinary Session Representative Danny Martiny pre-filed House 
Bill No. 28 (HB 28). The proposed legislation had no effect on the existing immunity provision 
of the 1993 act. However HB 28 bill added a new provision to § 735 stating: 
(2) Additionally, no prisoner in the custody of the sheriff or law enforcement 
agency who was evacuated to another prisoner jail during and immediately after 
Hurricane Katrina or Rita, and who was not released within the time required by 
the Code of Criminal Procedure or Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 
1950, shall have a cause of action for damages against the sheriff or law 
enforcement agency for the failure to timely release the prisoner, if the failure 
was due to the effects of Hurricane Katrina or Rita and the lack of access to 
prison records and information specifying when the prisoner is to be released; 
however, the sheriff or law enforcement agency shall be liable for damages if 
within a reasonable length of time following Hurricane Katrina or Rita, the 
sheriff or law enforcement agency makes no attempt to ascertain when the 
prisoner is to be released and fails to release the prisoner from custody.105
 
The new provision provided immunity to sheriffs or law enforcement agencies for delays  
in failing to timely release prisoners in custody during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The bill 
sailed through the House passing with a vote of 97 yeas, 4 nays before referral to the Senate. The 
Senate quickly passed the bill by a vote of 35 yeas, 2 nays. Governor Blanco signed the bill 
                                                     
104 La. House of Representatives, 2003 Reg. Sess. H.B. 942 (Act 40) History, 
<http://www.legis.state.la.us/bills/byinst.asp?sessionid=03RS&billid=HB942>.  
105 LSA-R.S. 29 § 735A(2). 
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making it law on December 6, 2005.106 The most unique aspect of the law was that it was given 
retroactive application to August 29, 2005.  
The Governor called the legislature to meet for the 1st Extraordinary Session 2006.  
During that session the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster 
Act was amended once again. House Bill No. 61 (HB 61) later adopted as Act No. 35 created a 
new state agency, the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. 
The new office, in and under direction of the Governor, became responsible for homeland 
security and emergency preparedness. The Military Department was relieved of its former 
obligations and responsibilities with the responsibilities now being assigned to the Director of 
the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness.107 The immunity 
provision § 735A again remained wholly intact. 
                                                     
106 La. House of Representatives, 2005 1st Ex. Sess. H.B. 28 (Act 46) History, 
<http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/History.asp?sessionid=051ES&billid=HB28>.  
107 LSA-R.S. 29:725. 
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Chapter V 
The Litigation 
 
Louisiana law is different than all the other 49 states. Louisiana law is based on the Code 
Napoleon while the other 49 states all have laws based on the English common law. The 
common law system is based on precedent. The Louisiana Civil Code takes the civilian law 
approach based on scholarly research and the drafting a code of laws passed by the legislature. 
When involved in litigation it becomes a judge’s job to interpret the legislative intent rather than 
just follow judicial precedent.  
The determination of the meaning of a statute from its language, controlled by certain 
settled rules, and assisted by certain accepted aids, constitutes construction. The legislature is 
presumed to mean what it plainly expressed. Consequently where a statute is in plain and 
unambiguous terms there is no necessity for construction for the province of construction lies 
wholly within the domain of ambiguity. Where, however the words of a statute do not make clear 
the meaning of the legislature (the intent), the court must resort to construction, and may go to 
the extent of expunging, inserting or changing the very words of the legislature. 
The object of construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature as expressed in the 
words of the statute. The principle that intent is the cardinal rule of construction, though long 
asserted by the courts, is misleading; for intent is more than a mere rule of construction; it is the 
object of construction. The purpose of the courts in formulating such rules is to provide 
directions for finding intent. This intent, when discovered prevails; and the language used is to 
be given such meaning as will make it effective. 
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The Sewerage and Water Board and Orleans Levee District, among others, are defendants 
in multiple consolidated Class Action Complaints filed in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana and elsewhere as is hereinafter noted.108  
The local bar did not wait long to gather facts and tens of thousands of clients sufficient to 
support claims wrought by Hurricane Katrina. On September 19, 2005 while the city of New 
Orleans was in the process of being drained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a mad dash to 
courthouse was taking place. The first of what would be fifty-one civil actions were filed against 
the Sewerage and Water Board and others including private companies, elected officials, the 
state and political subdivisions. All are seeking damages resulting from the levee and floodwall 
breaches following Hurricane Katrina.  
The suits were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, Civil District 
Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana and the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court 
for the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana. 
The study deals with the issue of the immunity defense argued as a preliminary defense 
in the litigation by the Sewerage and Water Board and Orleans Levee District. The plaintiffs are 
represented by local, state and nationally known members of the bar of Louisiana and elsewhere 
who literally flooded the courts with thousands of Hurricane Katrina related damage suits. The 
top defense lawyers and law firms from all over the state of Louisiana equally represent the 
defendants. 
On September 19, 2005, three weeks following landfall of Hurricane Katrina in 
Louisiana, the first Class Action Complaint109 was filed in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Louisiana, located in New Orleans, by Colleen Berthelot, et al,  
                                                     
108 In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, No. 05-4182, (E.D.La.) 2006. 
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“on their own behalf, and on behalf of a class of plaintiffs similarly situated but 
as yet unidentified as plaintiffs herein represent that they have injuries in 
common to all those similarly situated who incurred damages arising out of the 
breach and failure of the hurricane protection levees and flood walls situated in 
the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.”110  
 
Neither the state nor any political subdivision of the state of Louisiana was named in the 
initial complaint.  The complaint named only Boh Brothers Construction Co., L.L.C. and Gulf 
Coast, Inc. as being responsible for the damages caused by negligence during the course of 
construction activities of levees and floodwalls.111  
In identifying the members of the alleged “class” the allegation included:  
“all residents, domiciliaries, and property owners of Orleans and Jefferson in the 
state of Louisiana who were affected by the flooding caused by the failure of the 
hurricane protection levees and flood wall in New Orleans, Louisiana, and who 
have sustained any injury or damage thereby, or (b) who may suffer such injury 
or damage in the future as a result thereof, or (c) who have sustained a justifiable 
fear of sustaining such injury or damage in the future as a result thereof.”112
 
In amended pleadings and new suits filed in the year following Hurricane Katrina the list 
expanded to include the city of New Orleans, state of Louisiana, public officials, political 
subdivisions of the state, insurance carriers, contractors, architects, engineers and others as 
named defendants.    
United States District Court Judge Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., is the presiding judge 
assigned the litigation in federal court. Judge Duval promulgated a Protocol for Case 
Management, Case Management Order Number 1, on July 19, 2006, ordering:  
“…the caption of the consolidated matters shall be, and is hereby changed from 
Colleen Berthelot, et al. v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., L.L.C., et al to In Re: 
Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation…for case management 
purposes, In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation shall be divided 
                                                                                                                                                                           
109 A legal action undertaken by one or more plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all other persons having an 
identical interest in the alleged wrong.  Not one case has been certified by the court as a Class Action to date. 
110 In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, No. 05-4182, (E.D.La.) Doc. 1-1, I., (2006). 
111 Ibid III. 
112 Ibid IV. 
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into four sub-categories which are as follows: (1) Levee Cases, (2) MRGO Cases, 
(3) Insurance Cases, and (4) Responder Cases.”113 In a subsequent case 
management order the court added two new sub-categories (5) St. Rita and (6) 
Dredging Limitations.114  
 
Early in the litigation the Orleans Levee District moved for recusal of all Judges and 
Magistrates of the United States District Court En Banc, contending that pursuant to the 
constricts of Title 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 455(a)115 and § 455(b)(4)116, such recusal is mandated.117 The 
arguments were that as the result of the flooding of 80% of the city of New Orleans:  
(a) the courthouse closed its doors for two months forcing Judges and their staffs 
to work from other locations;  
 
(b) Chief Judge Helen “Ginger” Berrigan had issued a Global Order granting the 
United States of America’s Motion to Continue all pending criminal proceedings 
in the Eastern District;  
 
(c) other District Court Judges and Magistrates had issued rulings recognizing the 
incalculable impact of Hurricane Katrina on  themselves, their families, and the 
court as a whole; and  
 
(d) numerous Judges and Magistrates had recused themselves for reasons relating 
to the storm in other cases.  
 
Simply put the Orleans Levee District advocated that all Judges and Magistrates were 
technically putative members of the alleged class.  
Judge Duval denied the motion citing it to be procedurally improper but gave the Orleans 
Levee District additional time to file a proper motion seeking disqualification of Magistrate 
Wilkinson and himself.118 Following the adverse ruling the Orleans Levee District filed a 
                                                     
113 Berthelot  v. Boh, No. 05-4182 (E.D.La)  Doc. 790. 
114 In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, Doc. 1403. 
115 Section 455(a) provides, “Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any 
proceeding in which his partiality might reasonably be questioned. 
116 Section 455(b)(4) provides in relevant part: “He shall also disqualify himself…[where] he knows that he, 
individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his house Orleans Levee District, has a 
financial interest in the subject matter or controversy or is a party to the proceedings, or any other interest that could 
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.” 
117 In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, Doc. 53. 
118 Ibid. Doc. 56. 
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separate Motion for Disqualification of Judge Duval as trial judge citing specific reasons why 
recusal was in order.119  Another defendant, Washington Group International, Inc., filed a similar 
motion.120 The court allowed oral argument on April 19, 2006.121 In a lengthy ruling issued May 
4, 2006, Judge Duval denied both motions.122  
The Orleans Levee District then filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to the United States Court of Appeals 
Fifth Circuit. 123 The writ was denied.124  
Thereafter the Orleans Levee District applied for a Supervisory Writs to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. The writs were denied.125
In Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans the Orleans Levee District (CDC) filed 
Motions for Recusal of each judge assigned a Katrina related case for similar reasons as were 
argued in federal court. The Civil District Court has yet to rule on any motion(s) for recusal. 
Every time a judge of the court is assigned to hear a pre-trial motion the Orleans Levee District 
has challenged that judge’s impartiality to hear the matter causing the case to be reassigned to 
another judge for the purpose of holding an impartial hearing on the issues. For this reason the 
cases are at a virtual standstill in Civil District Court.  
The status of the litigation in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of 
Jefferson (24th JDC) is not much better even though all judges voluntarily stepped aside and a 
judge from outside the Greater New Orleans area was appointed to handle the matters.126
                                                     
119 Ibid. Doc. 61. 
120 Ibid. Doc. 63. 
121 Ibid. Doc. 198. 
122 Ibid. Doc. 285. 
123 An order issued from a court requiring the performance of a specified act, or giving authority to have it done. 
Latin: We command.  
124  In Re: Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District; Washington Group International, Inc. 06-
30351(C.A. 5 Cir) (2006). 
125 Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Website; Current Developments Section, Last Updated: March 28, 2007, 
<http://www/laed.uscourts.gov/CanalCases/CanalCases.htm>.  
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In federal court the Post-Katrina litigation has become so voluminous that for the benefit 
of the lawyers, litigants and other interested parties seeking information about the “In Re: 
Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation” a special website has been created.127  
According to Case Management Order No. 4: “The total number of cases consolidated in 
this action varies from day to day, but currently includes approximately 170 separately filed civil 
actions, including about four dozen putative class actions. They have been consolidated in this 
court for case management purposes because they appear to include common issues of law and 
fact involving the cause and effect of the inundation by water of the Greater New Orleans area 
during Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 and immediately thereafter.”128
The state court litigation seeks damages from the Sewerage and Water Board of New 
Orleans and the Orleans Levee District and others. The United States of America is not named in 
any state court proceeding because the federal government can only be sued in federal court. 129  
In order to address the never-ending issues arising daily Protocol For Case Management 
– Case Management Order Number 1 was issued to delineate a set of rules by which parties in 
those cases presently consolidated before the court and all parties in litigation subsequently 
consolidated shall be bound.130  
                                                                                                                                                                           
126 Honorable John Peytavin of the 23rd Judicial District Court for Assumption Parish. 
127 http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/CanalCases/CasesCases/.htm. 
128 In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, Doc. 3299 
129 Baudot v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 06-09718 (Civ. Dist. Ct.), 2006; Bennett v. Board of 
Commissioners for the East Jefferson Levee District, 635-594 (La. 24th JDC) 2006; Brubbacher v. Board of 
Commissioners for the Orleans Levee District, 06-09775 (Civ. Dist. Ct.) 2006; Diggs v. Sewerage and Water Board 
of New Orleans, 06-09753 (Civ. Dist. Ct.) 2006; Fleming v. United States of America,  06-5159 (E.D.La) 2006; 
Green v. Board of Commissioners for the Orleans Levee District, 06-09803 (Civ. Dist. Ct.) 2006; Hoskins  v. State 
of Louisiana, 06-8439, (Civ. Dist. Ct.) 2006; Laurendine v. Board of Commissioners for the Orleans Levee District,  
05-11660 (Civ. Dist. Ct.) 2005; Metters v.  Board of Commissioners for the Orleans Levee District, 06-09796 (Civ. 
Dist. Ct.); Pfister  v. Board of Commissioners for the Orleans Levee District, 06-09786 (Civ. Dist. Ct.) 2006; Rieth 
v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 06-09744 (Civ. Dist. Ct.) 2006; Robinson  v. Sewerage and Water 
Board of New Orleans, No. 06-09726 (Civ. Dist. Ct.) 2006; and Rodriguez v. Sewerage and Water Board of New 
Orleans, 06-09763 (Civ. Dist. Ct.) 2006. 
130Berthelot, 05-4182, Doc.  790.  
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On March 1, 2007 the court issued “Case Management and Scheduling Order No. 4” 
mandating the filing of “Master Class Action Pleadings” in the Levee, MRGO and Insurance 
cases, the only three claim categories addressed in the order.131  
The Superceding Master Consolidated Class Action Complaint was “intended to 
supercede and replace all class action complaints arising from the catastrophe which previously 
have been filed in or transferred to this (sic) Section of Court, and placed within the “Levee” 
category of cases.”132  
Plaintiffs allege that the Orleans Levee District and Sewerage and Water Board had 
responsibility for: dredging activity in the 17th Street Canal that compromised the safety of the 
canal levees and floodwall systems; breached duties by seeking a dredging permit for the 17th 
Street Canal; was negligent by failing to withdraw the request for the dredging permit; seeking to 
have the 17th Street Canal dredged to a depth lower than the sheet piles; and for refusing to agree 
to the implementation of the Congressionally-authorized “Barrier Plan” which would have 
reduced storm surge from Hurricane Katrina and prevented the adoption of a flawed, alternative 
plan with respect to the 17th Street Canal.133  
In connection with the design and construction of the levees and floodwalls plaintiffs 
allege the Sewerage and Water Board had responsibility for design and construction of the 
levees/flood wall system along with the Orleans Levee District and others134and was negligent in 
failing to discover risks and dangers associated with the design and construction of the 17th Street 
Canal levee/flood wall system.135
                                                     
131 In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, Doc. 3299. 
132 Ibid., Doc. 3420.  
133 In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, Doc. 3420. 
134 Ibid., Doc. 3420, ¶ 217 
135 Ibid., Doc. 3420, ¶ 229 
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          Similar allegations are directed at the Orleans Levee District in that they: also refused to 
agree to the implementation of the “Barrier Plan” which would have reduced storm surge from 
Hurricane Katrina and prevented the adoption of a flawed, alternative plan with respect to the 
17th Street Canal; and failed to conduct appropriate oversight, maintenance and inspection of the 
17th Street Canal levee/floodwall system by allowing dredging in the 17th Street Canal.136  
In connection with design and construction of the levees and floodwalls plaintiffs allege 
that the Orleans Levee District: had responsibility for design and construction of the levees/flood 
wall system along with the Sewerage and Water Board and others and137 was negligent in failing 
to discover risks and dangers associated with the design and construction of the 17th Street Canal 
levee/floodwall system.138
The damages run the gamut from wrongful death, property damage, property losses, 
evacuation expenses, mental anguish and suffering, loss of income and other economic losses 
and a need for medical monitoring (Robinson);139 destruction and environmental contamination 
to property, mental anguish, emotional distress, inconvenience, loss of use of property, loss of 
property, loss of property value, loss of profits, loss of business opportunity and fear of future 
injury and death (Fleming);140 exposure of individuals and property to flood-borne toxic 
substances requiring future medical monitoring and  increased insurance costs and family 
separation (Bennett).141
In law, a class action is an equitable procedural device used in litigation for determining 
the rights of and remedies, if any, for large numbers of people whose cases involve common 
questions of law and fact. Anyone in the state of Louisiana impacted by Hurricane Katrina are 
                                                     
136 Ibid. Doc. 3420, ¶¶ 210-212 
137 Ibid. Doc. 3420, ¶ 217 
138 Ibid. Doc. 3420, ¶ 229 
139 Robinson 
140 Fleming 
141 Bennett v. Board of Commissioners of the East Jefferson Levee District, No. 635-594 (La. 24th JDC) 
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conceivably putative members of the class. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern Class 
Action proceedings.142 On March 30, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a formal Motion for Class 
Certification in accordance with Rule 23 of the Federal of Civil Procedure.143  If the class is 
certified and the plaintiffs are successful in proving liability and damages, the judgment will be 
staggering.  
Risk Management Solutions, the world’s leading provider of products and services for 
the quantification and management of catastrophic risks, expects the economic loss only will 
exceed $100 billion from Hurricane Katrina and the Great New Orleans Flood.144 The Corps of 
Engineers documented that the claims filed by the state of Louisiana and the City of New 
Orleans alone exceed $277 billion dollars.145 Literally the potential damages in the litigation are 
incalculable.  
The immunity section of the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance 
and Disaster Act, § 735 is of paramount importance to the Sewerage and Water Board and the 
Orleans Levee District. It serves to insulate these governmental entities from all liability for their 
role in “emergency preparedness” under the act. If the agencies are protected by the act, as the 
legislature intended them to be, then the public trough at state and local levels is protected as it 
should be.  
The immunity provision was enacted to protect those entities and individuals covered by 
the act: “while complying with or attempting to comply with this Chapter, or any rule or 
regulation promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter from liability for the death of 
or any injury to persons or damage to property as a result of such activity, “except in the case of 
                                                     
142 Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 
143 In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, Doc Nos. 3629, 3612  
144 <http://www.rms.com/NewsPress/PR_090205_HUKatrina.asp>.  
145 Eyewitness News Report at 6 p.m., WWL-TV, New Orleans, Mar. 21, 2007. 
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willful misconduct”.146  The statue is silent as to need for a formal declaration of a state of 
emergency by the governor to trigger relevant provisions of the act.147  
The Sewerage and Water Board and Orleans Levee District have in pre-trial pleadings 
argued that dismissal under § 735 is warranted.148 Critical to an understanding of this mandatory, 
non-discretionary provision is the definition of “emergency preparedness.”  
La. R.S. 723(3) defines emergency preparedness as follows:  
“Emergency preparedness” means the mitigation of, preparation for, response to, 
and the recovery from emergencies or disasters. The term “emergency 
preparedness shall be synonymous with “civil defense”, “emergency 
management”, and other related programs of similar name.”149   
 
The Orleans Levee District and Sewerage and Water Board are political subdivisions of 
the State of Louisiana.150 In providing reasons for dismissal under § 735 there are substantial and 
irrefutable facts: the claims arose out of a natural or manmade disaster, Hurricane Katrina and any 
actions the Orleans Levee District and/or Sewerage and Water Board took in furtherance of their 
statutory mandate for flood protection or drainage fit squarely within the broad definition of 
“emergency preparedness.” Moreover “emergency preparedness” is synonymous with “emergency 
management.”  
§ 723 Definitions  As used in this Chapter: 
“Disaster” means the result of a natural or man-made event which causes loss of 
life, injury, and property damage, including but not limited to natural disasters, 
such as hurricanes, tornado, storm, flood, high winds, and other weather related 
events, forest and marsh fires, and man-made disasters, including but not limited 
to nuclear power plant incidents, hazardous material incidents, oil spills, 
explosion, civil disturbances, public calamity, acts of terrorism, hostile military 
action, and other events, related thereto.” 151
 
                                                     
146 LSA-R.S. 29:735A(1). 
147 Ibid. § 724. 
148 Ibid. § 735(A). 
149 Ibid. § 723(3) 
150 LSA-R.S. 38:291(K), 307, et seq. & 33:4071 et seq. 
151 LSA-R.S. 29:723(1) 
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Without question Hurricane Katrina was a “disaster.”  The Superceding Master Class 
Action Complaint acknowledges this fact. The entire premise of the litigation is firmly rooted in 
principle that Hurricane Katrina was the precipitating cause for a sequence of events leading to the 
failure of the levees and floodwalls.  
§ 723 (2) “Emergency” is defined in the Act as:  
(a) The actual or threatened condition which has been or may be created by a 
disaster; or 
 
(b)(i) Any natural or man-made event which results in an interruption in the 
delivery of utility services to any consumer of such services and which affects the 
safety, health, or welfare of a Louisiana resident; or 
 
(ii) Any instance in which a utility’s property is damaged and such damage 
creates a dangerous condition to the public. 
 
(iii) Any natural or state emergency, including acts of terrorism or a 
congressional authorization or presidential declaration pursuant to the War 
Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.)152 
 
It is indisputable that Hurricane Katrina as it approached the coast of Louisiana as a 
Category 5 hurricane created an “emergency.”153 Striking Coastal Louisiana and following the 
path it took just east of New Orleans with its torrential rainfall and wind speeds nearly approaching 
175 mph created an actual “disaster.”  
Maintaining levees, floodwalls, flood control structures and equipment needed in 
furtherance thereof are ongoing statutory responsibilities of levee districts. Likewise planning for, 
implementing and/or making improvements in flood control structures be they floodgates or water 
depth monitors constitutes “emergency preparedness.” Dredging outfall canals to facilitate greater 
hydraulic flow of water from pumping stations to and thru outfall canals connected to Lake 
Pontchartrain and increasing pumping capacity also unquestionably constitute “emergency 
                                                     
152 Ibid. § 723(2)(a) and (b) 
153 Ibid. Proclamation No. 62 KBB 2005. 
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preparedness.” Levees, floodwalls, drainage pumping station and drainage canals are not built 
overnight. Looking at the big picture a broad time frame (i.e. years) rather than a limited timeline 
(i.e. days, weeks or months) should be factored into the equation.    
La. R.S. 38:325 empowers each levee board within the state to engage in any activities 
related to flood protection and the construction and maintenance of levees. Building and 
maintaining levees and other flood control structures are acts of emergency preparedness 
entitling a levee district to immunity under La. R.S. 29:735154  
The immunity provision § 735 applies to both man-made and natural disasters, 
pretermitting any argument over the cause(s) of the levee failures or floodwalls. As a matter of 
law, La. R.S. 29:735 bars plaintiffs’ actions for personal injury and property damage arising out 
of levee breaches in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  
Recognizing the Orleans Levee District and Sewerage and Water Boards’ immunity, 
advances the Act’s purpose articulated in La. R.S. 29:722(A) for Katrina certainly was a 
“disaster” of unprecedented proportion. President Bush, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin all 
issued formal proclamations identifying Katrina and its aftermath as both a disaster and 
emergency.155
         Further arguing that constructing, maintaining and inspecting levee are acts of “emergency 
preparedness” as defined in the act we look to the statutory mission of the Orleans Levee District 
(in compliance with specific federal guidelines and assurances, and at the direction of the Corps 
of Engineers) to locate, relocate, construct, maintain, extend and improve levees…”156 Levees 
                                                     
154 Hontex Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Westwego, No. 02-506 (La. App. 5 Cir 12/11/2002); 833 So.2d 1234, writ 
denied, 2003-0505 (La. 9/5/2003); 852 So. 1041. 
155 Ibid. Proclamation No. 62 KBB 2005; President George W. Bush Declaration of Emergency, Aug. 2005. 
156 LSA-R.S. 38:307(A)(1) 
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have but one purpose; namely, to protect residents from flooding.157 The plaintiffs are well 
aware of this fact for they allege in their complaint in great detail that the purpose of the levees 
was to protect residents in Southern Louisiana from flooding.158 Louisiana courts have also 
recognized the role of levees in “emergency preparedness.”159
             Plaintiffs alleged the Orleans Levee District was negligent and/or strictly liable for 
failing to test whether the design, construction and maintenance of the levees were adequate, 
proper and within standards and ensure the adequacy of the construction, design and 
maintenance of the levees. Essentially the plaintiffs allege that their damages resulted from the 
Orleans Levee District being unprepared for this emergency. These allegations are directed to 
acts of negligence in preparing for any emergency or disaster potentially caused by a hurricane 
such as Hurricane Katrina. For these reasons and others § 735 should clearly serve as a complete 
bar to claims against the Orleans Levee District as a result of the levee and floodwall failures. 
The Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, as noted previously, is charged with 
drainage of the City of New Orleans to prevent flooding.160 The purpose of drainage is to prevent 
flooding from rainfall, storms, and/or hurricanes. The Superceding Master Consolidated Class 
Action Complaint alleges failures in the Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project 
resulting in flooding after Hurricane Katrina and the failure of the Hurricane Protection 
System.161 The Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project is a federal project for which the 
Sewerage and Water Board or Orleans Levee District bear no responsibility. Their only 
                                                     
157 33 U.S.C. 701, et seq., The Flood Control Act; Board of Com’rs of the Orleans Levee District v. Kelly  73 So.2d 
299 (La. 1954)  
158 E.g. Berthelot, 05-4182 (E.D.LA) Class Action Complaint, ¶ XIII, Tauzin, 06-0020, (E.D.La.) Class Action 
Complaint, Introduction and ¶¶ 44-50,59-60; Sanchez, 06-2287 (E.D.La.) Class Action Complaint ¶12. 
159 Ibid. Hontex Enterprises, Inc.  
160 LSA-R.S. 33:4082.1-4093. 
161 Ibid. In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, Doc. 3420, 104-149. 
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contributions to the project were the federally mandated cost-sharing agreement that in default of 
payment would have contributed to the delay of implementing the project.  
In response to the complaints the Sewerage and Water Board denied all allegations 
specifically averring forty-eight separate affirmative defenses including the defenses of 
immunity found in Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes § 2793.1 and § 2800. The relevant 
portions of these statutes state: 
§ 2793.1 Immunity from liability for public entities; fire departments; law 
enforcement agency; public emergencies; F.B.I. agents 
 
 A.No person shall have a cause of action against a public entity or the officers or 
employees thereof for damage to property at he site of a crime, accident, or fire, 
including without limitation the destruction or deterioration of property, caused 
while the officer or employee was acting in the course and scope of his office or 
employment and while taking reasonable remedial action which is necessary to 
abate a public emergency, unless such damage was caused by willful or wanton 
misconduct or gross negligence. 
 
B. (1) As used in this Section, “public entity” mans the state, or a political  
subdivision…       
(2) For purposes of this Section, the term “public emergency” includes any 
emergency in which there is a potential threat to life or property requiring 
immediate or remedial action, in order to insure the safety and health of 
persons and property…    
 
§ 2800.Limitation of liability for public bodies    
A.A public entity is responsible under Civil Code Article 2317 for damages 
caused by the condition of things within its care and custody. 
  
B. Where other constructions are placed upon state property by someone other 
than the state, and the right to keep the improvements on the property has 
expired, the state shall not be responsible for any damages caused thereby 
unless the state affirmatively takes control of and utilizes the improvement 
for the state’s benefit and use. 
 
C. Except as provided for in Subsections A and B of this Section, no person shall 
have a cause of action based solely upon liability imposed under Civil Code 
Article 2317 against a public entity for damages caused by the condition of things 
within its care and custody unless the public entity had actual or constructive 
notice of the particular vice or defect which caused the damage prior to the 
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occurrence, and the public entity has had a reasonable opportunity to 
remedy the defect and has failed to do so. 
 
D. Constructive notice shall mean the existence of facts which infer 
actual knowledge.  
 
G (1) “Public entity” means and includes the state and any of its branches,     
     departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities,   
     officers, officials, employees, and political subdivisions and the    
     departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities,    
     officers, official, and employees of such political subdivisions… 
 
The immunity defenses available under Title 9 are separate and totally distinct from the immunity 
defense available under § 735 of the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and 
Disaster Act.162The act’s immunity provision does not end at affording protection to a political 
subdivision’s actions in designing, constructing and maintaining levees or performing drainage 
responsibilities. In very clear terms, La. R.S. 723(A)(3) extends the scope of immunity to a political 
subdivision’s “response to, and the recovery from emergencies or disasters.”    
The Plaintiffs’ first line of defense in opposing the Orleans Levee District’s and 
Sewerage and Water Boards’ Motion for Dismissal was that the motions were premature. Citing 
that the litigation was still in its early stage plaintiffs’ argued that there was much discovery to be 
done dealing with a multiplicity of issues including: (a) all dredging and other improvement 
activities undertaken by the Orleans Levee District and/or the Sewerage and Water Board of 
New Orleans in the 17th Street or London Avenue Canals; (b) interference by the defendants with 
the Corps of Engineers desire to install tidal gates and pumps at the drainage canal outfalls along 
Lake Pontchartrain in the 1960’s and thereafter; (c) the application and approval process 
concerning the permit the Sewerage and Water Board received from the Corps of Engineers in 
1988 to widen and deepen the 17th Street Canal; (d) other permits for projects that the Sewerage 
and Water Board or the Orleans Levee District applied for and received from the Corps of 
                                                     
162 LSA-R.S. 9:2793.1 & 2800. 
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engineers; (e) the Sewerage and Water Board’s investigation and response to citizen complaints 
of water allegedly leaking from the 17th Street Canal and pooling in their back yards in advance 
of the floodwall collapse; and (f) a complete examination of the maintenance and inspection 
procedures undertaken by the agencies in furtherance of their statutory mandated and/or 
agreements with the Corps of Engineers. 
          Secondly plaintiffs’ argued that even if the most favorable provisions of the Louisiana 
Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act were applicable, as suggested 
by the Orleans Levee District and Sewerage and Water Board, the specific provisions of § 735 
does not exempt the agencies if proof of “willful misconduct” is proven in the agencies disaster 
response or emergency preparedness activities.  
Plaintiffs’ contend that the building of levees and floodwalls in and around New Orleans are not 
“emergency preparedness” activities as defined by the act. They contend that there must actually 
be an impending emergency or an emergency in progress for § 735 to apply. They cite, for 
example, that: years of shoddy levee construction; annual inspections of 129 miles of levees 
taking less than three hours by vehicle; opposition to Corps of Engineers recommendations 
delaying construction and implementation of the complete hurricane protection system project 
envisioned in 1965, among other reasons, cannot be considered as “emergency preparedness” 
activities under any reasonable interpretation of these terms. Plaintiff attorneys attempted to 
distinguish the jurisprudence (case law) cited by the governmental agencies as being clearly 
inapplicable considering the particular facts and circumstances alleged in the Katrina litigation. 
Plaintiffs’ further suggested that the Orleans Levee District breached its statutory obligations 
giving rise to absolute or strict liability.  
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Relevant statutory law submitted firmly rooted their argument that § 735 does not 
apply.163 The statutory violations coupled with the levee district’s negligence and sub-standard 
levee construction arguably provided overwhelming reasons for the court to ultimately deny the 
relief prayed for by the Orleans Levee District after holding the matter under advisement for over 
four months. 
           Plaintiffs argued that the Sewerage and Water Board: failed to follow recommendations 
suggested by the Corps of Engineers to remedy that the board’s drainage canals were slowly 
sinking; opposed the Corps plan to install tidal gates and pumps at the drainage canal outfalls 
along Lake Pontchartrain for fear that the tidal gates would malfunction inhibiting the outflow of 
pumped storm water, which would in turn cause flooding; knew that widening and deepening of 
the 17th Street Canal might weaken the stability of the canal, its levees and floodwalls; failed to 
properly investigate, report to other authorities (i.e. the Corps or Levee District) and come to a 
reasonable conclusion as to the source of water pooling in rear yards of homeowners who lived 
directly adjacent to the 17th Street Canal in the year before the floodwalls failed after multiple 
citizen complaints. 
             Plaintiffs acknowledge the Sewerage and Water Board’s statutory responsibilities are to 
operate and maintain the drainage systems of the City of New Orleans.164 Rejecting the 
Sewerage and Water Board’s argument that its responsibility for drainage ends at the discharge 
end of the pumping stations (i.e. the base of the outfall canal) the plaintiffs’ contend that the 
Board’s position ignored over 100+ years of their historical duty to maintain the drainage canals 
– the entire length and full extent of the canals. Consistent with the duty to maintain the canals 
                                                     
163 LSA-R.S. 38:181, 301, 307, 315, 325. 
164 LSA-R.S. 33:4071 
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plaintiffs argued that the Board had an obligation to insure that it (the Board) did nothing to 
diminish the structural integrity of the drainage system.  
Although the Board disclosed no evidence of any involvement in the maintenance of the 
17th Street Canal, the plaintiffs’ argued that the case of Kelly v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., Inc., 
contradicted this fact.165
            In Kelly the Sewerage and Water Board participated in joint venture with the Orleans 
Levee District in the 17th Street Canal. Boh Bros. was hired to perform dredging operations to 
improve hydraulic flow and drainage capacity of the canal just north of the pumping station and 
the bridge over the canal on Veterans Boulevard. Chet Kelly and Kenneth Perez were injured on 
November 3, 1990 in the 17th Street Canal when the small boat there were in collided with an 
unmarked wire or cable attached to one end to a crane boom high above the water line and at the 
other end to a heavy bucket being used as an anchor, at the bottom of the waterway. The crane 
was situated on a barge owned by Boh Bros., doing the dredging work for the Orleans Levee 
Board and the Sewerage and Water Board. The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal accepted 
the factual findings of the trial court that Boh was acting on behalf of the levee district and board 
resulting in a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.166
Responding to the Sewerage and Water Board’s argument that the Corps of Engineers and the 
Orleans Levee District are statutorily responsible for maintaining the levees and that the Flood 
Control Act is dispositive on that issue, the plaintiffs asserted the Flood Control Act clearly 
provides that once completed -- levee projects are to be turned over to the levee district protected 
for maintenance thereafter.167 
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167 33 U.S.C.A. § 702. Mississippi River. 
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         Lastly the plaintiffs rejected the Sewerage and Water Board’s assertion that the Southeast 
Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project (SELA) established a federally mandated legal 
responsibility concerning the subject levees.168 The purpose of the SELA project in Orleans and 
Jefferson Parishes was for the channel and pumping station improvements to support the 
parishes’ master drainage plans and generally provide flood protection on a level associated with 
a ten-year rainfall event, while also reducing damages for larger events.169   
          The Louisiana Fifth Circuit recognized the right of a levee district to invoke the Act’s 
immunity provisions in Hontex Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Westwego. In Hontex the court noted 
that defendant, the City of Westwego had immunity under § 735 for the alleged negligent acts 
taken to prepare for an emergency.  What the city did was build a ring levee around a leaking pie 
at Hontexs’ shrimp processing plant because the plant was outside the West Jefferson Levee 
District’s hurricane protection levee and flooding inside the ringed levee caused damages to 
plant equipment and nearby landowner’s properties. The Hontex case was fact specific and was 
decided on Motion for Summary Judgment after many depositions were taken. The pump that 
was leaking water that caused the problem (flooding) belonged to the seafood company and not 
the city. 170
        Another reported decision addressing in applicability of La. R.S. 29:735 is Castille v. 
Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, in which case the § 735 afforded immunity to 
the City of Lafayette in a negligence action brought by vehicle occupants injured as the result of 
debris city employees left on the roadway during clean up efforts after Hurricane Lili (2002). 
Affirming the trial court’s granting the City’s summary judgment, the Third Circuit held that 
                                                     
168 Water Resource Development Act (WRDA) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-303; Pub. L. 104-46 (§§ 108 and 533. 
169 Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project, Jefferson, Orleans & St. Tammany Parishes, LA Fact Sheet, 
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“clearing roadways of debris deposited by a hurricane to allow emergency vehicles to pass” 
constituted emergency preparedness activities, entitling the City and its employees to immunity. 
However it is noted that in this case only the city, no employees, were sued and the only statute 
involved was R.S. 29:735. The city was held immune but the willful misconduct provision was 
not considered because no employees were sued. 171  
        In Clement v. Reeves the defendant, Lafayette Parish Consolidated Government (LCG), 
argued that they were immune from civil liability as a result of the state of emergency declared 
in advance of and in the wake of Hurricane Lili.172 Shannon Clement and others were passengers 
in a truck driven by Dusty Reeves on December 20, 2002. Reeves lost control of the vehicle and 
crashed into a ditch when he failed to safely negotiate a ninety-degree turn on a road in a rural 
area of Lafayette Parish. Plaintiffs argued that the LCG failed to maintain the road sign that 
would have warned Reeves of the approaching turn. LCG presented evidence that Hurricane Lili 
struck the coast of Louisiana on October 3, 2002. Governor Mike Foster declared a state of 
emergency on October 1, 2002, which was extended for an additional forty-five days on October 
31, 2002 and that the Lafayette City-Parish President, had declared a state of local disaster and/or 
emergency on October 1, 2992. LCG argued that the alleged act of negligence occurred on 
October 20th, when a Department of Transportation employee inspected the sign on October 
30th during the time period that the states of emergency were in effect therefore triggering the 
immunity provision.173  Rejecting LCG’s argument the court found that the accident occurred on 
December 20, 2002, after Governor Foster’s declared state of emergency expired on December 
                                                     
171 Castille v. Lafayette  City-Parish Government, 04-1569(La. App. 3 Cir. 3/2/2005); 896 So. 1261, writ denied, 
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14th and that the “actual or threatened condition” of Hurricane Lili had obviously long been over 
on December 20.174   
      Building and maintaining levees and other flood control structures are acts of emergency 
preparedness and the immunity provision applicable as is noted in a footnote in the case of Yates 
v. Elmer. 175 Charles Elmer a property owner in Jefferson Parish brought suit against the West 
Jefferson Levee District for damages due to inverse condemnation and/or damages due to the 
construction of public works. Elmer alleged that construction of a levee along the edge of his 
property amounted to an illegal taking and caused devaluation of his remaining property. Finding 
for the West Jefferson Levee District the court held that the levee district’s actions in raising the 
Northern levee in 1985-86 after Hurricane Juan was not a taking, thus not an expropriation, as 
the taking of the property for construction of the levee occurred in the early 1920’s with the 
construction of the four foot “Westwego levee” on the north side of the property. The court 
further noted in Yates that under the defense of governmental immunity, the public entity is 
immune from liability for negligence when the acts are discretionary under La. R.S. 9:2798.1 
which provides: 
§ 2798.1 Policymaking or discretionary acts or omissions of public entities or 
their officers or employees 
 
A. As used in this Section, “public entity” means and includes the state and any 
of its branches, departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, 
instrumentalities, officers, officials, employees, and political subdivisions and the 
departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, 
officials, and employees of such political subdivisions. 
 
B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees 
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their 
policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and 
scope of their lawful powers and duties.  
 
                                                     
174 Clement, 285. 
175 Yates v. Elmer, 06-267 (La. App. 5th Cir. 11/28/06), 2006 WL 3422220 at n.8. 
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C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section are not applicable:  
  
(1) To acts or omissions which are not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental 
objective for which the policymaking or discretionary power exists; or  
 
(2) To acts of omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, 
willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct. 
 
(D) The legislature finds and states that the purpose of this Section is not to reestablish 
any immunity based on the status of sovereignty but rather to clarify the substantive 
content and parameters of application of such legislatively created codal articles and laws 
and also to assist in the implementation of Article II of the Constitution of Louisiana. 
 
or taken to prepare for an emergency under R.S. 29:735. 
       The Louisiana State Supreme Court has yet to rule on the immunity defense available to the 
state, state agencies, public officials, and others under § 735.  However the court has weighed in 
on other provisions of state law that provides immunity for discretionary acts. In Hardy v. Bowie 
the court examined the traditional public duty doctrine. The public duty doctrine has been 
defined as follows: 
[I]f the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the 
public, a failure to perform it, or an adequate or erroneous performance, must be 
a public, not an individual injury and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of 
public prosecution. On the other hand, if the duty is to the individual, then a 
neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may 
support an individual action for damages. “The failure of a public officer to 
perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong only when some person 
can show that in the public duty was involved also a duty to himself as an 
individual, and that he has suffered a special and particular injury by reason of its 
nonperformance” 
 
concluding that the public duty doctrine and its exceptions are not the law of Louisiana. Rather, 
the court concluded the provisions of La. R.S. 9:2798.1 and the duty-risk analysis are used to 
determine whether public entities and their officers and employees are liable.176  
On December 29, 2006, Judge Duval in the case of Armstead v. Nagin,177 issued an order 
approving the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (Wilkinson)178 
                                                     
176 Hardy v. Bowie, 744 So. 606 (1999). 
177 Armstead v. Nagin, 2006 WL 3861759, at pp. 15-16 (E.D. La. 2006). 
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adopted its (sic) opinion as to the plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim against the Orleans Levee 
District under state law citing as the reason therefore was that Plaintiffs’ have not alleged any 
facts to show that the Levee District committed any willful misconduct that would exempt it 
from the immunity granted by Section 29:735.179 In adopting Magistrate Judge Wilkinson’s 
Report and Recommendation in Armstead Judge Duval rejected Magistrate Wilkinson’s 
interpretation of La. R.S. 29:735 stating: 
“the court does not agree with any tangential inference that the acts or omissions 
of the levee board performed at times remote from Hurricane Katrina come under 
the ambit of the immunity statute LA Rev. Stat. 29:735.”180
 
Considering that the Louisiana State Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue we turn 
to the Erie Doctrine.181The Erie case involved a fundamental question of federalism and the 
jurisdiction of federal courts in the United States. Congress passed a law, still in effect today 
called the Rules of Decision Act that states that the laws of a state furnish the rules of decision 
for a federal court sitting in that state.182
           The Erie Doctrine case law is well settled. When the state’s highest court has not squarely 
addressed an issue of state law, the federal court must make and “Erie guess.”183 The United 
States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit has instructed:  “[i]f the Louisiana Supreme Court 
has not ruled on an issue, then this court must make an ‘Erie guess’ and ‘determine as best as it 
                                                                                                                                                                           
178 Ibid. Doc 74. 
179 Milton and Mayda R. Armstead, acting pro se, filed suit against several federal, state and City of New Orleans 
governmental defendants, alleging various claims arising out of the flooding on New Orleans caused by Hurricane 
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181 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
182 Rules of Decision Act , 28 U.S.C. 1652. 
183 Howe Ex Rel Howe v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2000); Powers v. Vista Chemical Co., 109 F.3d. 
1089, 1093 (5th Cir. 1997); Rogers v. Corrosion Products, Inc., 42 F.3d 292, 295 ((5th Cir. 1995); Kirkland v. 
Franco, 92 F.Supp. 578, 581 (E.D. La. 2000)); Bauer v. GEICO, 61 F.Supp. 514, 517 (E.D. La. 1999) 
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can’ what the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide.”184 “In making an Erie guess, the court 
may look to decisions of intermediate courts for guidance.”185 Decisions of intermediate 
appellate courts in Louisiana “are a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be 
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest 
court of the state would decide otherwise.”186 The Fifth Circuit has also noted: “[a]lthough the 
refusal to grant a writ has no precedential effect, such a refusal does provide ‘persuasive’ 
evidence that the Louisiana Supreme Court approves of the legal conclusions reached by the 
appellate court.”187
          The Erie doctrine, discussed above, called for the federal court to rely upon the decision of the 
intermediary court (the Louisiana Courts of Appeal) for guidance on an issue of state law. The Louisiana 
State Supreme Court’s denial of writs in Hontex is “persuasive” evidence that the Court approves of the 
legal conclusions reached by the appellate court.188 Thus the argument made to the court was that the it 
was bound to follow the Louisiana Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Hontex and the Louisiana Third Circuit’s 
ruling in Castille, recognizing the Orleans Levee District’s and Sewerage and Water Board of New 
Orleans’ rights to statutory immunity under La. R.S. 735. 
          An analysis of the immunity provision from the standpoint of the agencies and the litigants 
sets the framework for the issue squarely in the arena for judicial interpretation and legislative 
revision in the upcoming and futures sessions of the Louisiana Legislature.  
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The Ruling(s) 
The court denied the motions in a ruling issued December 29, 2006 citing the test for 
determining the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).189 The court found that the 
plaintiffs had, at this point set forth, a sufficient set of facts in support of their claims that would 
entitle them to relief. The court addressed the immunity provision in light of the definition of 
“emergency preparedness” and found that the allegations, acts or omissions by the Orleans Levee 
District and Sewerage and Water Board spanned many years before any specific emergency had 
taken place and even in some instances before the Act was passed. The court also found that the 
Orleans Levee District and Sewerage and Water Board each had statutory duties that “are 
separate and apart from the duties arising from the Act.”190
In denying the motion for dismissal Judge Duval reasoned: 
“The gravamen of this motion is whether the statutory obligations and/or acts or 
omissions of defendants as set forth above meet the definition of “emergency 
preparedness” of La. Rev. Stat. 29:735. The Court notes that the acts or omissions 
alleged by plaintiffs span many years.”  
 
The court went on to recite the passing of the Louisiana Homeland Security and 
Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act in 1993 referring to various provisions of the act 
including the § 735(A) immunity provision. The court stated:  
“the allegations of plaintiffs which must be accepted as true allege acts and 
omissions which took place years before any specific emergency, and some of 
them took place before the Act was passed. Additionally, plaintiffs have alleged 
that each defendant has statutory duties that are separate and apart from the duties 
arising from the Act. The acts of defendants complained of here are substantially 
attenuated from what this Court deems is the purpose of the Act and the 
concomitant grant of immunity. In the Court’s opinion, the acts complained of 
herein are not the type of “emergency” actions contemplated under Section 735.” 
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In distinguishing the reasons for ruling contrary to the ruling in the Armstead case 
wherein he adopted the Report and Recommendations of Magistrate Wilkinson, Judge Duval 
concluded:  
“The Court does not agree with any tangential inference that the acts or omissions 
of the Levee Board performed at times remote from Hurricane Katrina come 
under the ambit of the immunity statute. La. Rev. Stat. 29:735.” “…the actions of 
defendants immediately prior to and subsequent to Hurricane Katrina were the 
thrust of the complaint in Armstead. Thus, Armstead is factually distinguishable 
from the allegations of this case.”191
 
While Judge Duval was considering the motion for dismissal Judge John L. Peytavin, 
Judge Ad Hoc, sitting for the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson 
issued rulings September 29, 2006, in two Post Katrina flooding cases.  
In Levy v. Parish of Jefferson and Loga v. Parish of Jefferson the court rejected 
exceptions based on immunity. In both cases the Parish of Jefferson argued they were immune 
from liability citing § 735 arguing that Katrina was a “disaster” and created an “emergency.” 
They further argued that the Act provided Aaron Broussard, the Parish President, and the parish 
with “absolute immunity with no temporal element.” They claimed the immunity would apply to 
any course of conduct even ones “extending back for years and years.” In the Levy case the 
Parish was sued, among other reasons, because the Parish President, Aaron Broussard, ordered 
pumping station personnel to leave their posts prior to the anticipated brunt of Hurricane Katrina. 
While the stations were unmanned the drainage canals on the East Bank of the Parish filled with 
water and flooded various areas of Jefferson Parish causing damages to eight town houses owned 
by the plaintiff.192 Citing that the plaintiffs pleaded facts alleging willful, wanton and gross 
negligence in the first amended petition were sufficient to overcome the immunities of the 
immunity statutes cited.  
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The court further concluded that the statutory immunity provided by La. R.S. 9:2798.1 is 
not absolute, citing the case of Mitter v. St. John the Baptist Parish wherein the 5th Circuit Court 
of Appeal stated: 
“In well-analyzed and well-written reasons for judgment, the trial judge stated in 
pertinent part: 
 
‘It is unthinkable that a governmental authority could be protected from liability 
in such a case as this where improvements to the drainage system relieving the 
problems of certain citizens (Belle Grove residents), causes problems to other 
citizens…’ 
 
Citing McCloud v. Parish of Jefferson,193 the trial judge quoted language from 
that case which supports a conclusion that the immunity in discretionary matters 
exercised by governmental agency is not absolute: 
 
“…Once a governmental body, however undertakes to provide drainage or to 
make general improvements to an existing system, it has a duty to perform this 
function according to reasonable standards and in a manner which does not cause 
damage to particular citizens…”194
 
The court further pointed out that according to the definition in Webster’s dictionary  
 
“absolute” is defined as “not limited by a Constitution, parliament, etc., unrestricted (an absolute  
 
ruler).” The phrase “absolute immunity” does not appear in any of the immunity statutes cited by  
 
either party.195
 
Though Judge Peytavin’s rulings predated the ruling of Judge Duval (December 29, 
2006) the rulings for the moment confirm that the state and federal courts are in agreement with 
each other on the interpretation of § 735 at this point in the respective litigation.196
Judge Duval attempting to lend some direction to the litigation convened a status 
conference January 11, 2007 at which time state judges from Orleans (Reese & Medley), 
                                                     
193 McCloud v. Parish of Jefferson, 383 So. 2d 477 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980). 
194 Mitter v. St. John the Baptist  Parish, 920 So. 265 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2005); 383 S.. 477 (La. App. 4th 
Cir. 1980) at p. 266. 
195 Levy, Reasons for Judgment September 29, 2006. 
196 Levy & Loga, Judgments, Sept. 29, 2006. 
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Jefferson (Peytavin) and St. Bernard (Vaughn) Parishes participated along with selected 
plaintiffs’ counsel, defense counsel and others.197 Upon recommendation by the court all agreed 
to abide by a discovery plan designed to avoid needless duplication and streamline discovery. 198 
It is anticipated that a proposed plan to consolidate all state cases and incorporate them in federal 
court under the umbrella of the “In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation” would 
be in the best interest of all parties. Only time will tell if this is possible. 
The United States Supreme Court has found that legislative intent is the touchstone of 
federal statutory interpretation. In Philbrook v. Glodgett the court noted “Our objective…is to 
ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will.”199 In the case of United 
States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns the court held “In the interpretation of statutes, the function of 
courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of 
Congress.”200 See also the case of ICC v. Baird wherein the court found “The object of 
construction, as has often been said by the courts and writers of authority, is to ascertain the 
legislative intent, and, if possible, to effectuate the purposes of the lawmakers.”201Although the 
decision was rendered in 1904 the ruling is still valid today. 
In a constitutional system predicated upon legislative supremacy, within constitutional 
boundaries, judges must try to ascertain what the legislative body meant by the words it used. Is 
there any question that the Louisiana Legislature when defining the purpose of the Act by using 
terms such as “…emergencies and disasters of unprecedented size and destructiveness resulting 
from…flood…or other natural or manmade causes” in § 722; “disaster and emergency 
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preparedness” in § 723; and “immunity of personnel” in § 735 was not amply clear in their 
intent. I think not.  
           The term “textualism” refers to a philosophy that emerged in the courts near the close of 
the twentieth century. The term “textualism does not admit of a simple definition, but in practice 
is associated with the basis proposition that judges must seek and abide by the public meaning of 
the enacted text, understood in context (as all texts must be).”202  
Justice Antonin Scalia joined the Supreme Court of the United States in September 1986 
following his nomination by President Ronald Reagan. Before Justice Scalia’s appointment--and 
to this day--the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation could be described as eclectic, devoid 
of any unifying theory.203 The Court is sometimes governed by statutory text.204 At other times it 
looks beyond the text to statutory purposes,205 legislative history,206 or other nontextual 
sources.207 Justice Scalia challenged the Court’s traditional approach to interpreting statutes “He 
has argued that the only legitimate source for interpretive guidance is the statutory text at issue, 
the structure of the statute as a whole, or other related provisions of statutory law. As part of  this 
textualist theory, Justice Scalia has targeted the Court’s longstanding reliance on legislative 
history to interpret statutes.”208
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Statutory Interpretation.” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 76. No. 7 (October 1990) 1295-1374. 
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Justice Scalia, along with U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Chief Judge 
Frank H. Easterbrook, are “the leading exponents of modern “textualism”209 which deviates from 
“classic intentionalism”, a term used to connote “that when a statute was vague or ambiguous, 
judges as interpreters, should seek clarification if possible, in the bill’s internal legislative 
history.”210 Judge Easterbrook has opined “[T]he concept of ‘an’ intent for a person is fictive and 
for an institution hilarious. A hunt for this snipe liberates the interpreter, who can attribute to the 
drafters whatever ‘intent’ serves purposes derived by other means.” Justice Scalia argues “the 
quest for the ‘genuine’ legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase.” 211
         Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook “have advocated a radical assessment of the concept 
of legislative intent. They would reject, or at least sharply limit, reliance on legislative history, or 
they would abandon any consideration of congressional actions or statements after a statute was 
passed” and “they would go further and jettison the whole idea of legislative intent as a guide to 
interpretation.”212  
Philip A. Farber, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota and Philip P. Frickey, 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota, suggest that “courts foolishly give 
credence…to evidence of a legislative intent that itself is little more than a legal fiction” and 
argue that “only by jettisoning the whole idea of legislative intent can judges escape this 
chamber of illusions.”213 Advocating a “public choice” theory which would “apply economic 
methodology to the study of political institutions” Farber and Frickey suggest that some aspects 
of the public choice literature support the specific concerns raised by Justice Scalia and his 
                                                     
209 Ibid. Bob Jones, fn 217.  
210 Ibid. 419. 
211 Ibid. 420 fn 8. 
212 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, “Legislative Intent and Public Choice,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 74, 
No. 2, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice. (Mar. 1988) 423-469, 423. 
213 Ibid. 423. 
 60
fellow judges.”214 Briefly stated the “Public Choice Theory” is a body of theory developed by 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock to try to explain how public decisions are made. It involves 
the interaction of the voting public, the politicians, the bureaucracy and political action 
committees.215
“Appeals to legislative intent are a commonplace part of our judicial process. 
Nevertheless there are many unresolved disputes about the existence and discoverability of 
legislative intent” according to Professor Gerald C. Mac Callum, Jr., Associate Professor of 
Philosophy, University of Wisconsin.216 Mac Callum noted that University of California Law 
Professor Dr. Max Radin “argued that the presence of genuine legislative intent in connection 
with a statute is at best a rare circumstance and that, in any event, the legislative intent could not 
be discovered from the records of the legislative proceedings.” MacCallum further noted that 
Radin’s view drew “an immediate response from James Landis” a law professor at Harvard Law 
School. “Landis distinguished between two senses of “intent” – “intent” as “intended meaning” 
and “intent” as “purpose.” Landis “maintained that legislative intent in the first sense (and 
apparently in the second also) is an ordinary although not invariable feature of legislative 
processes.” Landis’ contention was that “this feature, when present, is clearly discoverable in the 
records of the legislative proceedings.”217
         Landis argues “the real difficulty is not that the intent is irrelevant but that the intent is 
often undiscoverable, especially when the passer of a state statute is, in most cases, a 
representative assembly.”218 Landis further stated “purpose and meaning commonly react upon 
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each other”…noting “that intent when used to mean purpose usually will be found to accompany 
the process of spurious interpretation, whereas intent when used as equivalent to meaning 
commonly accompanies the process of genuine interpretation.”219
           A look into the legislative history, that is opening the records of a legislative assembly 
“read with a knowledge of legislative procedure often reveal the richest kind of evidence.”220 
According to Landis “legislative history…affords in many instances accurate and compelling 
guides to legislative meaning” and by examining “successive drafts of the same act do not 
simply succeed each other as isolated phenomena, but the substitution of one for another 
necessarily involves an element of choice often leaving little doubt as to the reasons governing 
such a choice.”221
         MacCallum theorizes “the most obvious difficulty with the notion of legislative intent 
concerns the relationship between the intent of a collegiate legislature and the intentions of 
several legislators. Many difficulties would remain, however, if a legislature had only one 
authoritative member. We would profit, therefore, by asking what it would mean to speak of the 
legislative intent of a single legislator.”222
         Recent legal research on statutory interpretation has raised questions about the use of 
legislative history---committee reports, hearings, floor debates---in assisting judges in 
interpreting the intent of legislation. As an approach to interpretation of the meaning of a statute, 
McNollgast suggests that one of the three categories of recent literature on interpretation “seeks 
to develop interpretive principles that avoid the pitfalls identified by critical and political 
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theories.” When someone is faced with applying a statute, this literature recommends an 
interpretive agenda of roughly the following form: 
1. Read the text; if it is not clear, then proceed to step two. 
 
2. Consider the overall structure and purpose of the statute as written and, where 
relevant, other related statutes; if it is still not clear, then proceed to step three. 
 
3. Consult the legislative history to see if, in the course of the legislative process, 
elected political officials left a record about how ambiguities should be resolved, 
and proceed to step four. 
 
4. Based on the information collected in the previous steps, ascertain whether the 
statutory provision in questions reflects politically legitimate values or the 
pathologies of representative democracy; if the statue remains ambiguous, or if it 
reflects a democratic pathology, then proceed to step five. 
 
5. Invoke normative principles (varying among the authors) to determine whether 
the statute should be applied, and if so, how to resolve the ambiguities and 
compensate for the pathologies.223 
 
According to McNollgast “the legal literature to date lacks an approach to the broader 
methods of statutory interpretation that is fully compatible with how legislation is actually 
created and how elected officials oversee the implementation of policy by agencies and 
courts.”224  
Following this approach Justice Scalia “believes that a judge first should attempt to 
interpret a statutory term according to its plain meaning. If the language is ambiguous, as is often 
the case, the judge should look to considerations such as whether one possible meaning of a term 
comports better with the rest of the statute in question. Finally, the judge should offer an 
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interpretation that makes the best sense of the disputed statute in light of other related 
statutes.”225
     Richard A. Posner observed that “methods of statutory interpretation are not guided by an 
overall theory of legislation, and most academic lawyers, like most judges and practicing 
lawyers, would consider it otiose, impractical and pretentious to try to develop one.”226 
Interpreting legislative intent is important but does have limitations. The benefits accruing from 
the use of legislative history are marginal when weighed against the potential for abuse and the 
enormous effort involved. Undue reliance on legislative history when weighed in light of the 
democratic theory and practical considerations make the effort of the exercise questionable.227         
The legislative history of the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance 
and Disaster Act is silent as to the time periods applicable. How far should a court look forward 
or backwards, when faced with the question of the § 735 immunity defense in the face of  
“emergencies and disasters” or taking action in the form of “emergency preparedness” in 
advance either condition? Is there justification for recognizing legislative silence as an indicator 
of legislative intent as to the meaning of statutes?  
The problem of interpreting legislative silence usually arises after a court has construed a 
statute and the legislature either does nothing or re-enacts the statute without material change as 
is the case here. The interpreter should consider whether the legislature had knowledge of this 
construction. Then, if it assumed that the legislature did have such knowledge, he should 
determine whether the legislature’s inaction was intended to indicate approval of that 
construction. Those favoring the legislative silence doctrine in effect propose that these two 
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unknowns should be presumed in the affirmative, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The 
legislative silence doctrine, in most of the cases in which it is applied, is inconsistent with the 
proposition that statutes are to be construed in accordance with the intent of the enacting 
legislature. 
The Louisiana Legislature well aware of risks that Louisiana faced by:  “emergencies and 
disasters of unprecedented size and destructiveness… from…flood…or other natural or 
manmade disasters” passed the broad sweeping Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency 
Assistance and Disaster Act in 1993. The legislative history documented the need for revision of 
the Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974 following Hurricane Andrew (1992).228  
Thus in their wisdom the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and 
Disaster Act came into being in 1993 completely overhauling the 1974 legislation.229 In the years 
following the passage of the 1993 act, eight major hurricanes struck Louisiana: Opal (1995); 
Josephine (1996); Danny (1997); Frances (Sept. 10 –14,1998); Georges (Sept. 27-28,1998); 
Katrina (Aug. 29, 2005); and Rita (Sept. 24, 2005). The legislature has been called into session at 
least twenty-six times since the Act was passed with very few amendments to the act between 
1994 and 2006. Knowing full well that hurricane protection system(s) are and were designed, 
constructed and maintained with funds provided by the federal government, including levees and 
floodwalls (that cannot be built overnight), the undeniable conclusion is that the legislature 
certainly intended these activities to be protected by the Act, even though the statute and the 
legislative history are silent in this regard. 
To assess the success of the legislative intent of the Act for purposes of this study I have 
reviewed elsewhere the relevant decisions of state courts in Louisiana. I will not readdress the 
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cases but suffice to say the cases have been few. The Louisiana State Supreme Court, and 
conceivably the Supreme Court of the United States, will certainly face these issues in the future 
in light of the devastation wrought by Katrina and the billions of dollars at issue in the litigation.  
The immunity issue under § 735 can be raised again in the federal proceedings after 
extensive discovery has been completed via a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Orleans 
Levee District and the Sewerage and Water Board, along with other governmental defendants, 
must slowly and securely close the wide gaps that Judge Duval has opined are looming and 
unanswered questions to relevant factual and legal issues yet to be addressed. Based on law 
and/or facts the governmental defendants will again petition the court for dismissal by way of 
summary judgment upon proper showing that there are no genuine issues about any material 
fact(s) and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.230   
However the line between issues of fact and issues of law can be often difficult to 
draw.231 For example, when the application of rule of law depends on the resolution of disputed 
facts, the motion for summary judgment presents a mixed question of law and fact. In this 
situation, summary judgment might not be appropriate.232
In light of the Erie Doctrine the trial court will once again have a weighty issue to decide. 
This issue, the applicability of § 735 immunity provision, may ultimately drown the 
governmental defendants, the Orleans Levee District and Sewerage and Water Board of New 
Orleans, among others, with monetary judgments far beyond their ability to pay over the course 
of the lifetimes of all impacted by Hurricane Katrina. At this point in the history of the federal 
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and state litigation it is safe to say that the Act has not accomplished what the legislature 
intended.  
The governor convened the Legislature to an Extraordinary Session pursuant to 
Proclamation No. 62 KBB 2005 following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The proclamation 
limited the Legislature to legislate only the 77 enumerated items in the Proclamation under 
penalty of nullity,233 The Governor was short sighted in neglecting to include in Item No. 69234 
or in an additional item, a legislative proposal to re-enact and/or amend other provisions of LSA-
R.S. 721- 738, the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act.  
The Governor specifically addressed § 735 of the Act for special interest groups at the 
urging of law enforcement officials. By creating §735 (2) the revised Act, passed by the 
Legislature, provided immunity to yet another class of public officials and agencies who housed 
prisoners in custody during and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
What should have been included in the legislative call was a plan to include in plain and 
simple language that the building of levees, floodwalls and/or other parts of the hurricane 
protection systems within the state should unquestionably fall under the umbrella of “emergency 
preparedness” regardless of when the projects were planned, implemented, funded, constructed 
or maintained. Since the amendment to §735(2) had retroactive application it is inconceivable 
how and why our elected officials neglected to address a legislative problem that has far reaching 
consequences, much farther than the relatively small number of prisoners whose release from 
custody was delayed due to the devastation of records maintained by the criminal justice system. 
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Convening the Legislature for another Extraordinary Session for 12 calendar days, 
February 6 – 17, 2006, following the Extraordinary Session November 6 – November 22, 2005, 
the Governor again failed in including a proposal to buttress the Louisiana Homeland Security 
and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act in the limited 34 items on the agenda.235
Likewise the Legislature failed to address the need to address shortcomings in the 
Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act when conducting the 
2006 Regular Session of the Legislature, March 27 – June 19, 2006. In that 85 calendar day 
period limited to a maximum of 60 legislative days, not one elected representative filed 
legislation to strengthen the Act.236  
Governor Blanco in convening the Legislature to an Extraordinary Session for 10 
calendar days, December 8 – 17, 2006, failed again to address the gaping holes in the Act. The 
Governor’s agenda was limited to 25 items some of which dealt with the after effects of 
Hurricane and Rita and some of which had nothing whatsoever to due with protecting the public 
fisc from “disasters.”237
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                                                       Chapter VI. 
                                                     Findings    
As the Legislature prepares for the 2007 Regular Session an opportunity to fortify the 
legislation exists by any number of legislative means.238 Clearly there is a great need for 
addressing all aspects of the Hurricane Protection System(s) and the laws governing the agencies 
that maintain and/or control the systems. The legislature should revisit all statutory duties and 
responsibilities of levee districts statewide, local or parish drainage commissions, drainage 
districts and other state, quasi-state agencies, their employees and officials with an eye towards 
making the individuals immune from liability and the public fisc impenetrable. The time period 
addressed in any proposed legislation should be very broad in order for it to be liberally 
construed by the courts.   
The revised legislation should be stated succinctly so that the rules and aids for statutory 
construction can be plainly applied. The legislation must include explicit protection for all times 
relevant to any manner of “emergency preparedness,” “emergency preparedness planning,” 
“flood protection planning,” “drainage improvements, and “disaster planning.” By doing so the 
state, political subdivisions, or other agencies can rest assured that when confronting the: 
“existing possibility of the occurrence of emergencies and disasters of 
unprecedented size and destructiveness resulting from terrorist events, 
enemy attack, sabotage, or other hostile action, or from fire, flood, 
earthquake, or other natural or manmade causes, and in order to ensure that 
preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with such emergencies, or 
disasters, and in order to detect, prevent, prepare for, investigate, respond 
to, or recover from these events, and generally to preserve the lives and 
property of the people of the state of Louisiana…”239
 
they will be protected and immunity from liability.  
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Finding that the immunity provision § 735 of the act bears need for revision we need only look to 
the actions of the Louisiana Legislature in the First Extraordinary Session of 2005. I noted in 
Chapter three the legislative history including the reference to Act No. 46. Specifically Act No. 
46 originated in the Louisiana House of Representatives as House Bill No. 28 (HB 28) filed by 
Representative Danny Martiny the primary author, with 52 other representatives signing on as 
co-authors, for the purpose:  
“to amend and reenact R.S. 29:735(A), relative to immunity of law enforcement 
agencies during Hurricane Katrina or Rita; to provide for limitation of liability for 
law enforcement agencies and officers based on detention of persons in any 
parish prison or local jail under certain circumstances; to provide for liability of  
law enforcement agencies under certain circumstances; to provide for retroactive 
application; and to provide for related matters240  
 
The bill was passed and signed by the Governor becoming law on December 6, 2005. Section 2 
of the act states: “The provision of this Act shall be applied retroactively to August 29, 2005.”  
A law is retroactive if it alters the legal status of acts that were performed before it came 
into existence. In discussing the theories of retroactive law, Professor Stephen R. Munzer states 
“the concept of retroactivity has been paid scant attention in our jurisprudence.”241 Munzer 
argues “that an account of what it means for a law to be valid for the past explains how the legal 
status of the act affected by a retroactive law can change.”242 The Supreme Court has upheld 
retroactive legislation.243 Retroactive legislation is permissible except for the constitutional 
prohibition against ex post facto laws applicable to penal statutes only.244
The enactment of Act No. 46 with its retroactive application was clearly a response to a 
social crisis and disaster. The disaster was Hurricane Katrina. The social crisis was the complete 
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shut down of the criminal justice system in Orleans, Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes where 
approximately eight thousand people, mostly indigents, languished indefinitely in state prisons. 
The court system shut its doors, the police department fell into disarray, few prosecutors 
remained, and a handful of public defenders could not meet with, much less represent, the 
thousands detained.245  
Representative Martiny confirmed that the legislative revision to the act insulating law 
enforcement agencies from liability by way of Act No. 46, § 735(A)(2), was successful stating 
that “the time has passed for filing suits and none were filed.”246 The statute of limitations, one 
year, has run (Aug. 29, 2006) so the public fisc for law enforcements agencies statewide that 
denied constitutional rights of individuals by way illegal detention past their rightful release date 
was protected. This was exactly what the sheriffs’ offices statewide wanted and they got what 
they wanted. Thus the response to the social crisis and disaster was both legal and appropriate. 
Based on the foregoing the argument I find that if retroactivity in lawmaking is legal 
when on the face of this particular legislation, § 735(2), it treaded on the constitutional rights of 
individuals by depriving them of a right to seek damages from law enforcement agencies due to 
the crisis and disaster, Katrina, then why could not § 735(A) be retroactively applied to political 
subdivisions of the state in areas of “emergency preparedness and disaster planning.” I conclude 
that it can and it should. 
Such legislation making immunity retroactive to the state, political subdivisions and other  
agencies, in light of unprecedented disasters is certain to be highly unpopular in the eyes of the 
general public yet it would serve the public good by insulating the public pocketbook from 
potential bankruptcy given the depth and scope of the damage claims currently in litigation. 
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To find an author to sponsor such legislation, in spite of the lame duck status of the 
majority of the legislature, would be difficult if not nearly impossible. Constituents want help, 
they want grants, loans, Road Home247 money and their lives brought back to some sense of 
normalcy. Additionally the public represented by the nameless faces of Class Action litigation 
want someone answerable in damages for their personal and property losses that are incalculable 
in many instances. Were this not so the courts would not have been inundated with Post-Katrina 
litigation of the nature and scope addressed in this study. Local and state governments are no 
different in this quest for financial relief. They too find themselves begging at the troughs of 
FEMA, the federal government and in the halls of Congress for relief in the form of hundreds of 
billions of dollars.  
So what the legislature intended to do creating immunity in accordance with § 735 of the 
Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act is precisely what the 
state, political subdivisions and other agencies desperately need today. They need a clearly 
defined, statutorily sound and easily interpreted immunity provision and they need it now. They 
should not have to collectively endure the cost of millions of dollars in litigation expenses and 
the threat of money judgments rendered in response to the rising tide of litigation in the Post 
Katrina arena in the federal and state courts.  
The state, political subdivisions, and agencies, along with private individuals, are faced 
with insurmountable odds of recovery from the Post-Katrina flooding even though the Corps of 
Engineers bears full responsibility for the failure of the levees and floodwalls according to the 
three independent investigations to date.  
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The Mississippi River Flood Control Act248 renders the United States immune from 
liability for floods in connection with the construction or maintenance of flood works. Persons 
suffering damage from floodwaters have in such case no legal claim against the government.249 
The specific language of § 702c that states:  
“no liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any 
damage from or by floods or floodwaters at any place.”     
 
The task for the Louisiana Legislature is to draft a statute with the impenetrability that the 
federal government has enjoyed for the last eighty years with barely a chip in the armor. Only 
then will agencies such as the Orleans Levee District and the Sewerage and Water Board of New 
Orleans be able accomplish their statutory duties and responsibilities with full abandon.  
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                                                 Chapter VII. 
                                              Future Research 
Insofar as future research is warranted I suggest some very broad avenues researchers 
might find of interest. An extensive review of legislation currently in effect nationwide serves as 
the starting point for potential remedial legislation. Considering that Alabama,250 Alaska,251 
Arizona,252 Arkansas,253 California,254 Connecticut,255 Delaware,256 District of Columbia,257 
Florida,258 Georgia,259 Illinois,260 Indiana,261 Iowa,262 Kansas,263 Maine,264 Maryland,265 
Michigan,266 Missouri,267 Nebraska,268 Nevada,269 New Hampshire,270 New Jersey,271 New 
York,272 North Carolina,273 Oklahoma,274 Oregon,275 Pennsylvania,276 Rhode Island,277 South 
Carolina,278 South  
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255 C.G.S.A. § 28-23 
256 20 Del.C. §§ 3301, 3401 to 3403 
257 D.C. Code 1981 §6-1409 
258 West’s F.S.A. §§ 252.921 to 252.933 
259 O.C.G.A. §§ 38-3-70 to 38-3-73 
260 S.H.A. 45 ILCS 150/0.01 to 150/14 
261 West’s A.L.C. 10-4-2-1 to 10-4-2-3 
262 I.C.A. § 29C21 
263 K.S.A. 48-3201, 48-3202 
264 37-B- M.R.S.A. §§ 901 to 915; 921 to 933 
265 Code 1957, art. 41, §§ 19-101, 19-102 
266 M.C.L.A. § 30.261 
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271 N.J.S.A. 38A:20-3 
272 McKinney’s Unconsol.Laws, §§ 9231 to 9233 
273 G.S. §§ 166A-34 to 166A-47 
274 63 Okl.St.Ann.§§ 684.1 to 684.13 
275 ORS 401.045 
276 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 7111 
277 Gen.Laws 1956,§§ 30-15-14; 30-15.9-1 to 30-15.9-14 
278 Code 1976, §§ 25-9-10, 25-9-20. 
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Dakota,279 Tennessee,280 Utah,281 Virginia,282 Vermont,283 U.S. Virgin Islands,284 
Washington,285 West Virginia,286 and the United States of America287 all have complementary 
laws of differing degrees indicate the field is fertile for investigation and thought provoking 
ideas.   
Coordinating information through the National Conference of State Legislatures would 
provide an immediate channel to begin discussions between legislators, legislative bureaus and 
legislative staffs nationwide. The database online is readily accessible to members along with a 
dedicated staff of professionals who are up-to-date in current, pending and pro-active 
legislation.288
The National Governor’s Association identifies priority issues and deals collectively with 
issues of public policy and governance at both the national and state levels and is an excellent 
source for Governors to plan legislative input of special interest common to states susceptible to 
hurricanes, flooding, tornadoes, earthquakes and other common natural or manmade disasters.289
Lobbying members of Congress to pass legislation creating an independent, bipartisan 
commission, similar to the “The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States” also known as the “9-11 Commission” to investigate and adopt the findings of the three 
independent groups.290 These investigators all concluded that the failure of our federal 
government, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, is the root cause of the levee failures resulting in 
                                                     
279 SDCL § 33-15-48. 
280 West’s Tenn.Code §§ 58-2-401, 58-2-402.. 
281 U.C.A.1953, 39-5-1 to 39-5-3. 
282 Code 1950,§ 44-146.28:1. 
283 20 V.S.A. §§ 81 to 94. 
284 23 V.I.C. § 1128. 
285 West’s RCWA 38.52.091. 
286 Code 15-5-22. 
287 Jan. 12, 1951, Ch. 1228, 64 Stat. 1249. 
288 www.ncsl.org. 
289 www.nga.org. 
290 Ibid. IPET, ILET & Team Louisiana. 
 75
the utter devastation and flooding of 80% of the city of New Orleans. Such a commission, with 
the help of Congress and the President, could recommend legislation to resolve all damage 
claims out of court that would assist hundreds of thousands of people getting their lives in 
order.291
Legislative overhaul of the duties and responsibilities for the United States Department of 
Homeland Security, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in dealing 
with disasters of unprecedented size and scope is long overdue and merits further study. 
In light of the unprecedented crippling and near death of one of America’s greatest cities, 
New Orleans, Louisiana, the need for federal, state and local legislation to direct, protect, 
compensate and insure that no other U.S. city in the future will find themselves mired in the 
quick sand of the bureaucracy years after a catastrophic event such as Hurricane Katrina, the 
costliest hurricane ever in the history of world.  
This is but the first chapter in what will surely be a long lasting saga in the history of the 
state of Louisiana and the United States of America. God willing the experiences of all who 
suffered will aid others in dealing with seemingly un-surmountable odds of attaining full and 
complete recovery. 
                                                     
291 <www.9-11commission.gov/report>. 
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